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California Supreme Court Survey
May 1988-July 1988
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court as well as to serve as a
startingpointfor researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and

judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
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I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A.

Neither a constitutionalnor statutory right exists to a
trial by jury in a de novo proceeding in superiorcourt
consideringan appeal from a small claims court
judgment: Crouchman v. Superior Court.

In Crouchman v. Superior Court,45 Cal. 3d 1167, 755 P.2d 1075, 248
Cal. Rptr. 626 (1988), the supreme court held that there is no right to
a jury trial in a de novo proceeding in superior court following a
small claims court judgment. Although jury trials had been previously afforded under similar circumstances, the court distinguished
the present case, finding that such a right would impede the goals of
the small claims structure. See Maldonado v. Superior Court, 162
Cal. App. 3d 1259, 209 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1985); Smith v. Superior Court,
93 Cal. App. 3d 977, 156 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1979).
Initially, El Dorado Investors (real party in interest) was awarded
$1,500 by a small claims trial court. The real party in interest had
sued Joseph Crouchman (the defendant) for money due on a rental
contract. After judgment, the defendant, pursuant to section 117.10
of the Code of Civil Procedure, sought a trial de novo in the superior
court and demanded a jury trial. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 117.10
(West 1982 & Supp. 1989); 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,
Courts §§ 243, 247 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1988); 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 35 (3d ed. 1985). After denial by the superior court, the defendant sought a writ of mandamus from the court
of appeal forcing the superior court to grant a jury trial. The writ
was denied and the denial was affirmed by the supreme court.
The court was meticulous in affirming the court of appeal's decision. The court first outlined the small claims process and pointed
out that this forum was created in order to expeditiously and inexpensively handle matters involving small sums of money. See CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 116.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §§ 216, 230, 231 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp.
1988); 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Courts §§ 141-153 (1983 & Supp. 1988). The
court further noted that the means used to achieve this goal must be
informal. See CAL. R. CT. 155; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 117.10 (West
1982 & Supp. 1989). The court further noted that the desire for a
quick and inexpensive process necessarily meant there would be no
jury trials at the small claims level. After establishing this foundational premise, the court, eager to maintain consistency throughout
the small claims process, relied on three arguments for denying jury
trials in small claims proceedings.
First, the court examined the language of the small claims statute
and noted the legislative purpose never expressly provided for a jury
trial in small claims appeals. The court conceded that the legislature
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possessed the power to provide for jury trials but to do so would run
contrary to the informal atmosphere of the small claims process. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 117(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); 2 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts § 236 (3d ed. 1985).

More-

over, the court stated that small claims appeals are to be governed by
the same provisions that govern small claims actions at the trial
level. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.5 (West 1980); 5 CAL. JUR. 3D
Appellate Review § 816 (1973 & Supp. 1988). The court determined
that the same efficient informal guidelines that govern small claim
trials should also be used at de novo proceedings.
After clarifying the language of the small claims statute, the court
moved to its second line of reasoning, denying that a small claims defendant had a constitutional right to a jury trial. See CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 16. In considering the argument that the state constitution affords the right to a jury trial for a small claims appeal, the court established its position by relying on purely historical grounds. While
conceding that the language of article I, section 16 seemed all encompassing, the court was quick to explain that the constitutional right
to a jury trial pertained only to civil actions at law as they existed
when the constitution was first adopted. Proceeding from this premise, the court was unable to find the instant action as one that existed
when the state constitution was adopted or as a contemporaneous
counterpart. The court viewed the case as a modern proceeding, and
as such, determined no right existed.
The final segment of the court's analysis dealt with whether a statutory right to a jury trial existed under the rubric of section 592 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 592 (West
1976 & Supp. 1989); 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts
§ 247 (3d ed. 1985); 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury § 5 (1978 & Supp. 1988).
The court again considered this statutory question in a historical context. The court agreed that while it seems that section 592 affords
the defendant a right to a jury trial, it is important not to expand the
statute beyond its historical parameters, established in 1874, when
section 592 was adopted. During an elaborate historical discussion,
the court concluded that the 1874 amendment did not establish a new
concelt, but merely perpetuated the denial of juries to actions involving small sums of money. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 592 (West 1976
& Supp. 1989).
The court noted that the small claims court system was established
to provide poor plaintiffs with small claims a forum in which to redress wrongs quickly and efficiently. By refusing jury trials, the

court has maintained the expeditious aspect of the small claims process and has preserved the informal spirit of this forum, thereby perpetuating its effectiveness.
JOHN AUGUSTINE SOPUCH III

B. A civil statute which affects antecedent rights will operate
prospectively unless the legislature or the electorate has
specifically expressed a contrary intent: Evangelatos v.
Superior Court.
In Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246
Cal. Rptr. 629 (1988), the principle issue addressed by the California
Supreme Court was whether the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986,
commonly known as Proposition 51, was to be applied retroactively
or prospectively. In reversing the court of appeal's decision, the court
found that neither the legislature nor the electorate had expressed a
discernible intent that the statute was to operate retroactively.
Therefore, Proposition 51 is only applicable to actions that accrue
subsequent to its enactment. Id. at 1226-27, 753 P.2d at 611, 246 Cal.
Rptr. at 655.
Proposition 51 modified the traditional rule of joint and several liability. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 1989) (Proposition 51 was approved by the electorate on June 3, 1986.). Under
Proposition 51, joint and several liability applies to economic damages, including medical expenses and loss of earnings. However, several liability applies to noneconomic damages, including awards for
pain and suffering. Therefore, each defendant is liable only for the
portion of the noneconomic damages which are commensurate with
their degree of fault. Id.; see also 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 51-54 (9th ed. 1988).
In reaching its determination that Proposition 51 should not be applied retroactively, the court first examined the general principle of
statutory interpretation that unless a contrary intent is expressed, a
statute shall operate prospectively. This principle has been accepted
by both the United States Supreme Court and the California courts.
See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982)
(quoting Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S.
190, 199 (1913)); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 30 Cal. 2d 388, 393, 182 P.2d 159, 161 (1947); see also, 7 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw §§ 495496 (9th ed. 1988). In Security Industrial,the United States Supreme
Court stated that a statute which affects antecedent rights should not
operate retroactively unless the legislature has specifically expressed
a contrary intent. Security Industrial, 459 U.S. at 79 (citing Union
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Pacific, 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)). Furthermore, in DiGenova v. State
Board of Education, 57 Cal. 2d 167, 367 P.2d 865, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1962), the California Supreme Court held that "no statute is to be
given retroactive effect unless the Legislature has expressly so declared .... ." Id. at 174, 367 P.2d at 868, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
In addition, the court noted that section 3 of the Civil Code provides that "[n]o part of it [the Civil Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3 (West 1982). Section 3 is in
accord with other California Codes which also favor a prospective application of statutory amendments. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE

§ 3 (West 1982); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4 (West 1971); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3 (West 1984). Furthermore, this rule of statutory construction has
been embraced by a vast majority of jurisdictions. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 414 (1953 & Supp. 1988). The court concluded that civil statutes, such as Proposition 51, cannot apply to cases which were filed
prior to its enactment unless there is an express retroactive provision
or a retroactive intent on the part of the legislature of the electorate
that can be derived from extrinsic sources. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at
1209-10, 753 P.2d at 598-99, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43.
The defendants' principal contention was that both the drafters
and the electorate intended for Proposition 51 to apply retroactively.
The court first found that there was no evidence that the issue of retroactivity was consciously considered during the enactment process.
Id. at 1211, 753 P.2d at 599-600, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 643. The court then
noted that Proposition 51 is similar to the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) which was a significant tort reform initiative in the medical malpractice area. Following the
enactment of MICRA, two separate panels of the court of appeal held
the statute operative prospectively. See Bolen v. Woo, 96 Cal. App. 3d
944, 958-59, 158 Cal. Rptr. 454, 462-63 (1979); Robinson v. PediatricAffiliates Medical Group, 98 Cal. App. 3d 907, 912, 159 Cal. Rptr. 791,
794 (1979). The court concluded, based on the decisions in Bolen and
Robinson, that if the drafters had intended the statute to apply retroactively they would have expressly stated such a provision in the initiative. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1211-12, 753 P.2d at 600, 246 Cal.
Rptr. at 644.
Furthermore, the court rejected the defendants' contention that
the electorate had intended the initiative to operate retroactively.
The court concluded that there was no reliable basis from which the
intent of the electorate could be ascertained. Id. at 1212, 753 P.2d at
601, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 644. The court also rejected the defendants' ar-

gument that the remedial nature of Proposition 51 is evidence that
the electorate intended the initiative to operate retroactively. The
court reasoned that most statutory changes are enacted to improve a
pre-existing situation and, therefore, the defendant's contention was
flawed because it would result in nearly every statutory amendment
operating retroactively. Id. at 1213, 753 P.2d at 601, 246 Cal. Rptr. at
645. This would be in direct conflict with the general principle set
forth in section 3 of the Civil Code which favors the presumption
that statutes apply prospectively. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3 (West 1982).
Therefore, the court held that the defendants' contention that the
electorate had intended the initiative to operate retroactively could
not be substantiated. Id. at 1218, 753 P.2d at 604-05, 246 Cal. Rptr. at
648.
The defendants' next contention was that because Proposition 51
was adcpted to address the liability insurance crisis, the court should
infer that the electorate intended the statute to operate retroactively.
The defendants argued that if the statute is applied prospectively, the
primary purpose of the initiative would not immediately be effectuated. The court concluded that the defendant's contention was incorrect because insurance premiums are calculated based upon the
damages that the insurance company anticipates it will incur during
the period the specific policy is in force. Since Proposition 51 would
reduce the amount of damages an insurer would be liable for in tort
actions which accrued after the statute was enacted, the class of insured persons and entities would receive an immediate benefit in the
form of lower premiums. Furthermore, the court noted that premiums charged prior to the enactment of Proposition 51 were calculated
based on the assumption that insurers would incur greater liability
under the system of joint and several liability. Thus, the court reasoned that insurance companies would receive a windfall if the statute was applied retroactively. The court refused to infer that the
electorate intended the statute to operate retroactively. Id. at 121921, 753 P.2d at 605-07, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 647-51.
The defendants' final contention was that the weight of authority
in California favored a retroactive application of civil statutes. They
relied on a line of cases in which a statutory amendment which modified the legal measure of damages was applied retroactively. See Tulley v. Tranor, 53 Cal. 274, 279-80 (1878); see also Stout v. Turney, 22
Cal. 3d 718, 727, 586 P.2d 1228, 1233, 150 Cal. Rptr. 637, 642 (1978);
Feckenscher v. Gamble, 12 Cal. 2d 482, 499-500, 85 P.2d 885, 893 (1938).
The major flaw in the defendants' argument was that Tulley and its
progeny address the issue of whether the legislature had the power
to apply an amendment retroactively, the statutory interpretation
question raised in Evangelatos. Therefore, the court concluded that
the general principle that statutes operate prospectively unless a con-
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trary intent is expressed is unaffected by Tulley and its progeny.
Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1224, 753 P.2d at 609, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
Justice Kaufman vigorously dissented, stating that the intent of the
electorate was for Proposition 51 to be applied as soon and as broadly
as possible; therefore, the statute should be applied retroactively.
Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1227, 1232, 753 P.2d at 617, 620, 246 Cal.
Rptr. at 661, 664; see Fox v. Alexis, 38 Cal. 3d 621, 629, 699 P.2d 309,
314, 214 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137 (1985); In re Marriageof Bouquet, 16 Cal.
3d 583, 587, 546 P.2d 1371, 1373, 28 Cal. Rptr. 427, 429 (1976); In re
Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 746, 408 P.2d 948, 952, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176
(1965).
Justice Kaufman contended that two factors, the "history of the
times" and the "evils to be remedied" are extremely relevant in determining the electorate's intent as to whether Proposition 51 should
be applied retroactively. He noted that the initiative was conceived
in response to a "liability crisis" which plagued both private individuals and entities throughout the State of California. He also noted
that sixty-two percent of the electorate voted for the initiative. Furthermore, Justice Kaufman stressed that Proposition 51 was designed
to remedy the inequitable and unjust system of joint and several liability which was resulting in catastrophic economic consequences and
compromised various municipalities' ability to provide essential public services. Evangelatos,44 Cal. 3d at 1231-32, 753 P.2d at 619-20, 246
Cal. Rptr. at 663-64. Justice Kaufman concluded that the electorate
voted for immediate relief from the crisis situation which existed and
could be effectuated only by a retroactive application of Proposition
51. Id. at 1232-33, 753 P.2d at 620, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
Although Justice Kaufman raised some excellent arguments, the
intent of the drafters and the electorate cannot be conclusively ascertained as to whether the statute should apply retroactively. The
holding in Evangelatos should send out a clear message to initiative
drafters that if they intend a statute to operate retroactively, a clear
and unambiguous statement of such an intent must be embodied in
the proposition.
RONALD PAUL SCHRAMM

II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.

The citizen's constitutionalright to initiative is limited
when the legislature,acting on an issue of statewide
importance, vests authority in city or county officials:
Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court.

In Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d 491,
754 P.2d 708, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1988), the supreme court declared invalid an initiative containing enough signatures to qualify for the ballot. See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
ConstitutionalLaw § 85 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 38 CAL. JUR. 3D
Initiativeand Referendum § 65 (1977). In response to a proposed imposition of fees and taxes to construct three "transportation corridors," Irvine citizens sought to restrain the city council from such
action without prior electorate approval. The nonprofit group supporting the petition asserted a denial of their right to initiative as
guaranteed by the California Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 11; see also 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum §§ 1-2
(1977).
The court construed the initiative power narrowly and held it can
be legislatively denied when issues of "statewide" consequence are
raised which contradict state law. See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw § 87 (8th ed. 1974 &
Supp. 1984). To justify this conclusion, the court addressed whether
the initiative conflicted with any state law and whether it involved a
matter of statewide import.
As to the first issue, the proposal gave the people the right to veto
local government decisions imposing taxes and fees for highway construction. However, section 66484.3 of the Government Code [section
66484.3] expressly gives Orange County city councils the right to raise
highway funds through additional taxes and fees. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 66484.3 (West Supp. 1989). The plaintiffs argued that the statute's
specific reference to "city council" did not necessarily suggest an intent to preempt the electorate's involvement. However, the court rejected this contention, inferring such a legislative intent. Moreover,
the court found that the legislature's use of specific terms, such as
"city council," as opposed to a general reference to "local government," reinforced this conclusion. The court considered this interpretation justified in light of the statewide importance of the statute.
The issue thus centered on whether section 66484.3 was, in fact, a
statute of statewide import. See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 87 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp.
1984). The court, reasoning that even regional interests can constitute "statewide concerns," concluded that freeways and highways are
a recognized state concern. See CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 300 (West
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Supp. 1989). Since cities could not realistically build freeways without involving other municipalities, the court reasoned that the initiative affected not merely local issues, but regional concerns as well.
Noting the statewide importance of the statute and the initiative's
contravention of the statute's intent, the court invalidated the initiative. The court expressly emphasized that this result did not violate
the home rule guarantee to charter cities, nor the state constitution.
See 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, Corporations,Counties & Other Political Subdivisions § 98 (1971); 45 CAL. JUR. 3D Municipalities §§ 99113 (1978).
The court reasoned that a revocation of the right to initiative could
be justified without finding the local government's action to be "administrative." See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Constitutional Law § 88 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 38 CAL.
JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum §§ 3-4 (1977). Prior to Committee
of Seven Thousand, the legislature could bar an initiative only where
the proposed municipal action could be interpreted as administrative.
See Hughes v. City of Lincoln, 232 Cal. App. 2d 741, 745, 43 Cal. Rptr.
306, 309 (1965).
The court's decision was predictable in light of California's transportation problems. However, the decision is disturbing since the
court disregarded the principle that doubts in statutory construction
are to be resolved in favor of the right to initiative. Associated Home
Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473,
477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976); see also 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw § 68(3) (8th ed. 1974); 38 CAL.
JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum § 65 (1977). Faced with two conflicting mandates, one borne of statute and the other borne of the
constitution and common law, the court dangerously gave more
weight to an admittedly ambiguous statute.
MICHELLE R. ANDERSON

B. 'Article V, section 5, subdivision (b) of the California
Constitution, which sets forth the procedurefor filling
vacancies in high-level state offices, establishes that a
candidate is not acceptable if either house rejects the
nomination: Lungren v. Deukmejian.
In Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 755 P.2d 299, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 115 (1988), the court held that confirmation of a nominee for
State Treasurer under article V, section 5(b) of the California Consti-

tution (section 5(b)), requires acceptance by both state houses, or alternatively, a failure by either or both to act upon the nomination
within ninety days of its submittal. Should either house reject the
nominee, the nomination is deemed refused and the Governor must
put forth another candidate. See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 5(b). The
court concurred with the respondents (the Attorney General and the
Senate) that a more expansive interpretation of the section would
"seriously degrade the power and dignity of one house of the Legislature in the confirmation process." Lungren, at 738, 755 P.2d at 306,
248 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
Section 5(b) states in pertinent part:
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the... Treasurer.... the Governor shall nominate a person to fill the vacancy who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority of the membership of the Senate and a majority of the
membership of the Assembly [first sentence]. In the event the nominee is
neither confirmed nor refused confirmation by both the Senate and the Assembly within 90 days of the submission of the nomination, the nominee shall
take office as if he or she had been confirmed by a majority of the Senate and
Assembly... [second sentence].

CAL. CONST. art. V, § 5(b) (1966) (amended 1976) (emphasis added).

On February 25, 1988, the California Legislature voted to confirm
the nomination of Congressman Daniel Lungren as State Treasurer.
The Senate, however, rejected the nomination. Although Governor
Deukmejian held that confirmation by one house was sufficient
under section (b) to legitimize Lungren's confirmation, he did not allow Lungren to assume office fearing possible adverse consequences
on the sale of state bonds if a legal battle ensued.
Lungren filed an original petition for a writ of mandate with the
supreme court, alleging that he had satisfied all the legal requirements under section 5(b) 'to become State Treasurer. He asserted
that if the second sentence was read in light of its "plain meaning,"
then unless both houses voted to reject the nomination, a nominee
was deemed confirmed ninety days after his nomination was submitted to the legislature.
The court first addressed respondents' claim that Lungren's status
as a Congressman precluded mandate since he did not have a present
interest in the office of treasurer. See CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 7; see
also McCoy v. Board of Supervisors, 18 Cal. 2d 193, 196, 114 P.2d 569,
571 (1941). The court agreed with the respondents, holding that even
if Lungren resigned as Congressman and the court held in his favor,
he did not have a present right to hold the office of treasurer. The
court decided to exercise original jurisdiction, however, because of
the adverse effect a prolonged dispute might have on the marketability of state bonds; the court also considered it was in the public's interest to have the dispute resolved expeditiously. See Jolicoeur v.
Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 570, 488 P.2d 1, 3, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699 (1971).
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In addressing the "plain meaning" issue, the court agreed that if
the second sentence was read literally it might lead to the expansive
interpretation asserted by Lungren. However, the court held that individual sentences of a statute must be read in context with the other
provisions of the statute in order to ascertain their true meaning. See
Dyna-Med, Inc. v. FairEmployment & Housing Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d
1379, 1386-87, 743 P.2d 1323, 1326, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70 (1987).
In discounting Lungren's assertion, the court determined that the
first sentence was the main premise of the section (i.e., both houses
of the legislature must confirm a nominee) and that the second sentence was a proviso (i.e., a limitation on the operation of the first sentence). The court said the only effect of the second sentence was to
prevent the legislature from rejecting a nominee by failing to vote on
the nomination within ninety days after its submittal. Therefore, the
court held that Lungren's interpretation of the second sentence was
unreasonably expansive, for not only would it eviscerate the first sentence, but confirmation by one house would render the rejection by
the other house a nullity-a proposition totally inopposite to a bicameral legislature. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 72 AM. JUR. 2D States,
Territories and Dependencies, § 40 (1974); 42 CAL. JUR. 3D Legislature, § 1 (1978 & Supp. 1988).
The court also relied on legislative history, including a discussion
of the twenty-fifth amendment upon which section 5 was based. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. Additionally, statements by both opponents and proponents of section 5(b) proved that those who voted on
the section believed that "disapproval by either house would result in
rejection of the nomination, requiring the governor to submit another nominee to fill the vacancy." Lungren, 45 Cal. 3d at 741, 755
P.2d at 308, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 124. The court concluded that only this
interpretation, and not Lungren's, was "consistent with the voters'
intention in adopting section 5(b). Id. at 743, 755 P.2d at 309, 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 126.
Lungren is limited to those rare situations where vacancies in the
executive branch are filled by nominees appointed by the governor.
However, the expeditious manner in which Lungren was decided indicates its true importance: the question of who is State Treasurer is
resolved and the marketing of California bonds can continue without
the threat of legal intervention.
DANIEL RHODES

III.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Regardless of a defendant's subsequent actionsfollowing
a bargained-forguilty plea, the court must allow the
defendant to withdraw his plea if it intends not to abide
by the sentencing terms of the plea bargain: People v.
Cruz.

In People v. Cruz, 44 Cal. 3d 1247, 752 P.2d 439, 246 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1988), the California Supreme Court held that a defendant who does
not appear for sentencing is entitled to withdraw his bargained-for
plea if the court decides not to abide by the sentencing terms of the
plea bargain. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1982). The court
indicated that separate sanctions were available against the nonappearing defendant under sections 1320 and 1320.5 of the Penal Code.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1320, 1320.5 (West Supp. 1989). The court reaffirmed its holding in People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d 868, 519 P.2d 604,
112 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974), where it stated that the legislative intent of
Penal Code section 1192.5 was to allow the defendant the ability to
change his plea regardless of the defendant's subsequent acts. The
court also reaffirmed the First District Court of Appeal's decision in
People v. Morris, 97 Cal. App. 3d 358, 158 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1979), which
followed Johnson.
In Cruz, the defendant pled guilty under a plea bargain to felony
possession of heroin and received a reduced sentence. The defendant
was released on bail and failed to appear at the sentencing hearing.
At a subsequent sentencing hearing following his apprehension, the
trial court indicated that it would not follow the sentencing terms of
the prior plea bargain. The court denied the defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and imposed a sentence of two years in the
state prison. The court of appeal affirmed pursuant to its earlier decision in People v. Santos, 171 Cal. App. 3d 67, 216 Cal. Rptr. 911
(1985) (following failure to appear, defendant not entitled to withdraw plea or have sentencing terms enforced). See also 21 CAL. JUR.
3D Criminal Law § 2824 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
Justice Broussard, writing the majority opinion, acknowledged that
plea bargaining was a recognized practice in California. See generally
B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 265A-265P (Supp.
1985); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 504 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
Broussard noted that the legislature specifically indicated in section
1192.5 that a defendant, after entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, "shall be permitted to withdraw his plea if he desires to do
so." See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1982). He then discussed
Johnson and its progeny, which interpreted section 1192.5 as clearly
indicating the defendant's right to withdraw his plea regardless of his
subsequent conduct. See, e.g., In re Lunceford, 191 Cal. App. 3d 180,
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236 Cal. Rptr 274 (1987); People v. Rodriguez, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1566,
237 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1987); In re Falco, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1161, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 648 (1986); People v. Haskins, 171 Cal. App. 3d 344, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 685 (1985); People v. Morris, 97 Cal. App. 3d 358, 158 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1979).
In Morris, the First District Court of Appeal applied Johnson
where the defendant intentionally failed to appear for his sentencing
hearing. The Morris court held that section 1192.5 and Johnson mandated that the defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea regardless
of the defendant's intent or actions, if the trial court subsequently decided not to abide by the terms of the plea bargain.
In Cruz, the California Supreme Court specifically overruled Santos and its progeny, indicating that those decisions do not correctly
follow the legislative mandate in section 1192.5 or the Johnson line of
cases. Thus, in reversing both the trial and appellate court decisions,
the supreme court held that section 1192.5 clearly allows a defendant
to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere, regardless of his
subsequent actions, if the trial court intends not to abide by the sentencing terms.
ERNEST F. BATENGA

B. Disclosure of raw evidentiary materialsgathered by a
grandjury during a secret watchdog investigation is
fundamentally inconsistent with legislative parametersof
propergrandjury reporting: McClatchy Newspapers v.
Superior Court.
In McCaatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1162, 751
P.2d 1329, 245 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1988), the California Supreme Court
held that the Fresno Superior Court acted appropriately when it
struck a proposed grand jury report announcing its intended disclosure and subsequently sealed the transcripts, analyses, and summaries of testimony and documentary exhibits. The court found that
these steps were not only necessary, but vital in maintaining secrecy,
an element "central" to the effective function of the grand jury in
California.
The court reiterated three well-established grand jury functions:
(1) to consider charges of criminal conduct and determine whether or
not to return an indictment, CAL. PENAL CODE § 917 (West 1985); (2)
to weigh allegations of misconduct by public officials and determine
whether or not to formally request them to be removed from office,

§ 922 (West 1985); and (3) to investigate and report
on local government affairs as a public "watchdog," CAL. PENAL
CODE § 919 (West 1985). Grand juries are generally afforded authority to investigate and report on county operations, allegations of willful or corrupt misconduct of public officers, housing, imprisonment of
unindicted persons, prison conditions and salaries of county officials,
among other subjects. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 914-927 (West 1985).
It was the third enumerated function, that of a public watchdog, that
was at-issue in McClatchy. The Fresno grand jury conducted an investigation of the county's award of a $1.37 million computer service
contract to Systems and Computer Technology Corporation. After
questioning 62 witnesses, and gathering voluminous amounts of testimonial and documentary evidence, no indictments were returned.
However, upon urging by the district attorney, the grand jury proposed to publicly disclose raw evidence, including testimony transcripts, documents and other findings in their official report. The
superior court disallowed the proposed disclosure as violative of Penal Code sections 939.1 and 939.9. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 939.1, 939.9
(West 1985). These sections provide for the proper procedures to be
followed by the grand jury in making their order.
The McClatchy court focused its reasoning upon the premise expounded in People v. Superior Court (1973 Grand Jury), 13 Cal. 3d
430, 531 P.2d 761, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1975). In 1973 Grand Jury, the
court held that superior courts are vested with the authority to refuse to file grand jury reports they consider improper. However, this
authority is limited in order to afford grand juries the independence
and autonomy necessary to be effective. Superior courts must respect
this by not imposing its own sentiment upon the grand jury nor suppressing grand jury reports simply "because it considers it ill-advised,
insufficiently documented or even libelous." Id. at 439, 531 P.2d at
766, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 198. The final report of a grand jury is the
method by which it may make its recommendations known to the
public at large; but notwithstanding the broad yet carefully defined
powers granted by statute, the grand jury has no inherent investigatory powers beyond those statutorily granted. Id. at 437, 531 P.2d at
765, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 197. However, superior courts must retain the
ability to withhold the publication of a report that goes beyond the
scope of appropriate grand jury authority.
The California Legislature has set forth three circumstances where
disclosure of raw evidentiary materials may be permissible: (1) to determine
whether a witness's testimony is consistent with other testir
mony heard by the grand jury in perjury cases, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 924.2 (West 1985); (2) to make transcripts of grand jury testimony
available to the public ten days after the transcript has been delivered to the defendant, CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1 (West 1986); and (3)
CAL. PENAL CODE
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to disclose prior grand jury evidence to a succeeding grand jury, CAL.
PENAL CODE § 924.4 (West 1985). However, in McClatchy, the court
specifically stated: "There is no explicit statutory authority for the
grand jury to disclose to the public raw, evidentiary materials as part
of its final report in a watchdog investigation." McClatchy at 1178,
751 P.2d at 1338, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 783. Additionally, the court ratified
the Fresno Superior Court's reliance on Penal Code section 939.9
(prohibiting the grand jury from making reports except those based
on its own investigation).since disclosure of raw, evidentiary materials does not constitute a "report" based on the investigation; it is
merely a "recitation" of evidence. Id. at 1180, 751 P.2d at 1334, 245
Cal. Rptr. at 784.
The court noted the historical and modern importance of secrecy in
grand jury hearings and its manifestations, e.g., the oath that is given,
the private and closed nature of the proceedings, and the prohibition
of inspection of minutes of the meetings or subpoena of records. The
court echoed the United States Supreme Court's policy of protecting
grand jury secrecy in order to encourage witnesses to appear voluntarily, to testify fully and frankly, and to assure that persons accused,
but eventually exonerated, will not be publicly scorned. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983); Douglas Oil Co.
v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979). Thus, the court extended the secrecy rationale by sanctioning the maintenance of secrecy after the grand jury investigations have ended. Maintaining
secrecy, in both criminal indictment hearings and watchdog investigations, is of vital public interest since "eliciting candid testimony is obviously critical" to grand jury proceedings. McClatchy, 44 Cal. 3d at
1175, 751 P.2d at 1336, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
The California Supreme Court rejected various arguments premised on the right of public access, free expression and the public's
right to know under the California Constitution. First, the court refuted amicus curiae contentions that the California Public Records
Act created a justification for the grand jury's disclosure since judicial agencies, established by article VI of the California Constitution
are exempt from the Act. See CAL. CONST. art VI; CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 6250-6265 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). Although grand juries are not
specifically enumerated in article VI, the court held that the judicial
nature of grand juries and the important public interest in secrecy indicated legislative intent to exempt grand juries from the public access provision of the Act. McC7atchy, 44 Cal. 3d at 1178, 751 P.2d at

1338, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 783. See also 1973 GrandJury, 13 Cal. 3d 430,
438-39, 531 P.2d 761, 766, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (1975).
Second, the court rejected amicus curiae contentions that grand
jury reports are protected under the first amendment of the United
States Constitution which guarantees freedom of expression. The
court stated that "the grand jury is not a private body and its report
is not an expression of private citizens' views; rather the grand jury is
a governmental body and its official report, carrying the aura of a judicial pronouncement, is authorized only within established legal limits." McCatchy, 44 Cal. 3d at 1184, 751 P.2d at 1342, 245 Cal. Rptr. at
787.

Similarly, the court rejected as "unmeritous" the argument that article II, section I, of the California Constitution, creates an implicit
right of the public "to know." The section states: "All political power
is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform
it when the public good may require." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1. The
court noted that the people of the State of California have not, to
date, asserted their right to compel disclosure of evidence gathered in
grand jury proceedings. The court assumes that the reason is because
of the policy the court itself discussed.
Superior courts may be assured that they have discretionary authority to refuse to file reports containing information that they feel
is beyond the scope of proper reporting. California will continue to
follow its prior decisions regarding grand jury secrecy and the Penal
Code sections involved are quite clear on the parameters of grand
jury investigation. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Grand Jury §§ 1-41 (1968 &
Supp. 1987); 38 C.J.S. Grand Jury §§ 1-47 (1943 & Supp. 1988); 20
CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw §§ 2656-2694 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
LISA ELANE SLATER

C. Section 6676(c) of the Penal Code, which increases the
punishmentfor defendants convicted of certain sex
offenses, does not amend section 654's ban againstdouble
punishmentfor multiple .offenses based on the "same act
or omission": People v. Siko.
In People v. Siko, 45 Cal. 3d 820, 755 P.2d 294, 248 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1988), the court held that section 667.6(c) of the Penal Code (subdivision (c)), enacted to increase the punishment of people convicted of
serious sex crimes, does not repeal Penal Code section'654's (section
654) prohibition against double punishment for multiple violations
based on the "same act or omission." See CAL. PENAL CODE § 654
(West 1988); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6 (West 1988). The
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court based its holding on the lack of legislative intent to amend the
prohibition of double punishment. The court also found section 654
controlling, since subdivision (c) created no express exception for section 654.
Under subdivision (c), enacted in 1979, a full and consecutive term
may be imposed for each violation of the Penal Code pertaining to
certain serious sex offenses committed by force or violence "whether
or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction." See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2)-(3) (West 1988) (rape); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 264.1 (West 1988) (rape, sodomy); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 286 (West 1988) (sodomy punishment); CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a)(b) (West 1988) (lewd and lascivious acts with child under 14); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 289 (West 1988) (sodomy). In conflict with subsection
(c) is section 654. Originating in 1872, this section prohibits the imposition of consecutive sentences for a single act or omission, even
though the act or omission violates many provisions of the Penal
Code. See 22 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 3358 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
The defendant, Siko, was a sixteen-year-old boy who raped and
sodomized a nine-year-old girl. He was charged with forcible lewd
and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 involving sexual conduct (CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(b)); forcible rape (CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261(2)); forcible sodomy (CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(c)); and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (CAL. PENAL
CODE § 245(a)(1)). The defendant was convicted on all four counts,
receiving sentences of three years for the assault charge pursuant to
subdivision (c), and six years for each of the three sexual offenses.
Conceding that the three sexually-related convictions were appropriate, Siko contended that since he had committed only two criminal
acts, the three consecutive sentences violated section 654's ban
against multiple punishment. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
§ 551 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
The court agreed with the defendant that the lewd and lascivious
conduct for which he had been convicted consisted of the rape and
sodomy, and that he had been sentenced for three violations of the
Penal Code even though he had committed only two criminal acts.
To determine whether the sentences were valid, the court first had to
determine whether section 654 or subsection (c) was controlling., The
court first noted that, since 1962, section 654 had been interpreted as
allowing multiple convictions stemming from a single act or omission
but banning multiple punishment for those convictions. See People v.
Pearson, 42 Cal. 3d 351, 359-61, 721 P.2d 595, 599-601, 228 Cal. Rptr.

509, 514-16 (1986); People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 762-63, 376
P.2d 449, 455-56, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 479-80 (1962). The court stated:
[I]f a person rapes a thirteen-year-old, he can be convicted of both rape and
lewd conduct with a child on the basis of that single act, but he cannot be punished for both offenses; execution of the sentence for one of the offenses
[under 654] must be stayed.

Siko, 45 Cal. 3d at 823, 755 P.2d at 296, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (citation
omitted).
The court next examined the legislative history of subsection (c) to
resolve whether, by adopting the subsection, the legislature had repealed, either expressly or by implication, the prohibition of section
654 against multiple punishment for the same act. As the court failed
to find in subsection (c) an express intent to repeal the prohibition of
double punishment, it concluded that the requisite intent must be implied. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 300-302 (1974 & Supp. 1988); 58
CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes §§ 100-109 (1980). However, the court believed
that repeal by implication was disfavored generally, especially where
section 654 had been a staunch legal principle for over a century; if
the legislature had intended to overrule the century-old ban against
multiple punishment, subsection (c) would have been explicit. See
People v. Greer,30 Cal. 2d 589, 603, 184 P.2d 512, 520 (1947).
Finally, the court discredited the State's theory that consecutive
sentencing for the'same act was valid, absent express language to the
contrary. Rules of statutory construction presume that unless another statute expressly exempts itself, section 654 governs in every
applicable case. See People v. Milan, 9 Cal. 3d 185, 196-197, 507 P.2d
956, 963, 107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 75 (1973) (section 654 bans multiple punishment in many situations, not only when the criminal is subject to
it).
This opinion illustrates a major function of the state supreme
court: the determination of a statute's meaning by statutory construction and findings of legislative intent. Here, the court effectively limits subdivision (c)'s power to impose multiple punishments for
convictions arising out of applicable sex offenses. To circumvent section 654, the State will now have to establish sufficient independent
facts for each Penal Code violation arising out of a single act or omission if it is to secure multiple convictions and punishments for those
violations.
DANIEL RHODES
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Iv.

DEATH PENALTY
This section provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases imposing the
death penalty. Rather than a case-by-case approach, this
section focuses on the key issues under review by the
court and notes trends and shifts in the court's rationale.
. I.

INTRODUCTION

Between April and June, 1988, the California Supreme Court decided nineteen death penalty cases.' Of these, the court reversed
only two death sentences. 2 In contrast, during the tenure of Chief
Justice Rose Bird, the court upheld the death penalty in only four of
sixty-eight decisions. 3 The Lucas court's interpretation and application of the harmless error rule is of particular note.
In People v. Dyer,4 Chief Justice Lucas stated:
1. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 755 P.2d 1017, 248 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1988),
cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3487 (1989); People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 755 P.2d 253, 248
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3471 (1989); People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal.
3d 744, 755 P.2d 310, 248 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3471 (1989);
People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 753 P.2d 1, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 330
(1988); People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 755 P.2d 894, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3487 (1989); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 755 P.2d 917, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 467 (1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3487 (1989); People v. Hamilton, 45 Cal. 3d
351, 753 P.2d 1109, 247 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3485 (1989); People v. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 753 P.2d 629, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
380 (1988); People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 753 P.2d 1052, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert.
denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3471 (1989); People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d 669, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (1988); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 275 (1988); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 752 P.2d 1082, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 886 (1988); People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 755 P.2d 960, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1988),
cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3487 (1989); People v. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d 867, 755 P.2d 355,
248 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3471 (1989); People v. Silva, 45 Cal.
3d 604, 754 P.2d 1070, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3453 (1989);
People v. Siripongs, 45 Cal. 3d 548, 754 P.2d 1306, 247 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1988), cert. denied,
57 U.S.L.W. 3453 (1989); People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 753 P.2d 37, 246 Cal. Rptr.
245 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 404 (1989); People v. Warren, 45 Cal. 3d 471, 754 P.2d
218, 247 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1988); People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 1127, 751 P.2d 901, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 635, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 514 (1988) [hereinafter subsequent history omitted].
2. People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d 669, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988); People
v. Warren, 45 Cal. 3d 471, 754 P.2d 218, 247 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1988).
3. Rose Elizabeth Bird was Chief Justice from March 26, 1977, until January 5,
1987. The four cases which affirmed the death penalty during her tenure are People v.
Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986); People v. Fields, 35 Cal.
3d 329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1983); People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d
240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1981); People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 603 (1981). In 1986, the California electorate removed Chief Justice Bird and
Justices Grodin and Reynoso from the bench.
4. 45 Cal. 3d 26, 753 P.2d 1, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1988).

[T]he harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's
guilt or innocence, [citation], and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the
trial rather than on the vir5
tually inevitable presence of immaterial error.

The Bird court rarely found any error in capital cases, particularly
instructional error, to be harmless. 6 The Lucas court, on the other
hand, applies a harmless error analysis pursuant to Chapman v. California7 and Rose v. C7ark,8 allowing the court to affirm the death
penalty in most instances. 9 In People v. Odle,1O Chief Justice Lucas
stated that "under provisions of the California Constitution... reversal is required only if prejudice results from the error."'1 Chief Justice Lucas recently stated: "We believe we have made substantially
accurate law in the death penalty field."12
5. Id. at 47, 753 P.2d at 11, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (citing Delaware v. Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). See also TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 50 (1970)
("Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on. the judgment, encourages litigants to
abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it.").
6. See Erler & Vincent, The California Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 2
BENCHMARK 143 (1986) (critique of the Bird Court's approach to harmless error in capital cases); Note, CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey: Death Penalty, 13 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 1127-52 (1986) (survey of twelve death penalty cases under the Bird court all re-

versed for error).
7. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."). See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) ("[W]e
have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not
be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the
constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
8. 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986) ("We have emphasized ... that while there are some
errors to which Chapman does not apply, they are the exception and not the rule.").
9. See, e.g., People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 410-16, 754 P.2d 184, 197-201, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 137, 150-55 (1988). See TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970); Comment, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740
(1987); Note, ProsecutorialMisconduct: The Limitations Upon the Prosecutor'sRole as
an Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1095, 1107-13 (1980); see generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 193-197, 739-769 (1963 & Supp. 1985). 22 CAL. JUR. 3D
CriminalLaw §§ 3769-3778 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
10. 45 Cal. 3d 386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1988).
11. Id. at 415, 754 P.2d at 200, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 154. Chief Justice Lucas stated the
test of prejudice pursuant to People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 255
(1956), is:
whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant
would have been reached in the absence of the error ....
The Watson test
conforms to and satisfies the command of article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution that '[n]o judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in
any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury... unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'
Odle, 45 Cal. 3d at 415, 754 P.2d at 200-01, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (emphasis added).
12. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (response at press conference while
emphasizing that no capital decision of the Lucas court had been overruled by the
United States Supreme Court).

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey

[Vol. 16: 431, 1989]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

II.

GUILT-PHASE ISSUES

Of the nineteen death penalty cases decided between April and
June, 1988, the California Supreme Court unanimously resolved
every guilt-phase issue against the defendant. The facts of these
cases were particularly egregious, and the evidence against the various defendants was overwhelming.13 The issues raised by the defendants included denial of various pre-trial motions; 14 denial of a
16
representative or impartial jury; 15 denial of a vicinage jury; im13. For example, in People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137
(1988), the defendant, on parole after being convicted of armed robbery and auto theft,
bludgeoned his girlfriend with a tire iron in the presence of a friend. Because the victim survived the initial attack, the defendant then repeatedly stabbed her in the chest.
Two days later, after stealing a pickup truck to flee to the Sierra Nevada foothills, the
defendant shot and killed one of two officers attempting to arrest him. In People v.
Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 754 P.2d 1070, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1988), the defendant and two
accomplices abducted a young couple returning to college. The defendant shot the
young man between 32 and 64 times with a machine gun, and then instructed an accomplice to chop the body into at least 10 pieces for disposal. All three men raped the
young woman, two of them repeatedly, over a period of five days. The defendant then
disposed of the woman's body after shooting her in the head. Both accomplices testified against the defendant, both bodies were recovered, and all of the murder weapons
were admitted into evidence at trial. In People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 755 P.2d 960,
248 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1988), the defendant was convicted of four counts of-first degree
murder, as well as seventeen other counts, including kidnapping, rape, and numerous
sex crimes, all of which occurred within the same three-month period. After having
led the police to two of the bodies he had "discovered," he failed a polygraph test. He
then confessed numerous times in detail to the police and his friends.
14. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1000-03, 755 P.2d 1017, 1026-28, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 577-79 (1988); People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 275-78, 753 P.2d 1052, 1061-63,
247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10-12 (1988); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 401-04, 754 P.2d 184, 191-93,
247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 144-46 (1988) (motion to sever murder counts following consolidation pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1988)); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306,
320-22, 753 P.2d 1082, 1090-92, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 894-96 (1988); People v. Rich, 45 Cal.
3d 1036, 1074-76, 755 P.2d 960, 983-85, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 534-35 (1988) (motion to
change venue). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 21-22
(1963 & Supp. 1985); 20 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw §§ 2344-2347 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 4
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.04(4) (Supp. 1988).
15. In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), the United States Supreme Court
rejected the contention that exclusion of jurors unalterably opposed to the death penalty denied the defendant a representative and impartial jury. The California
Supreme Court had previously denied this contention. See People v. Anderson, 38 Cal.
3d 58, 60, 694 P.2d 1149, 1151, 210 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1985); People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d
329, 342-53, 673 P.2d 680, 686-95, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 810-18 (1983); Hovey v. Superior
Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 68, 616 P.2d 1301, 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 173 (1980). The supreme
court has refused to reexamine this holding on numerous occasions. See People v.
Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1007, 755 P.2d 1017, 1030-31, 248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 581 (1988);
People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 679, 755 P.2d 253, 261, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1988);
People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 848, 755 P.2d 894, 904, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 453 (1988);
People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 948-49, 755 P.2d 917, 936-37, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 487
(1988); People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 120-21, 753 P.2d 37, 58, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245,

proper restrictions upon defenge voir dire;17 improper use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution attorney;' 8 juror misconduct;19
improper substitution of alternate jurors; 20 admissibility2l and suffi266-67 (1988); People v. Warren, 45 Cal. 3d 471, 754 P.2d 218, 247 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1988).

See generally B.

WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§§ 331, 398-405, 412 (1963

& Supp. 1985); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law, §§ 2998, 3004, 3009, 3020 (1985 & Supp.
1988); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw, § 3345 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE §§ 81.01(1), 87.05(1)(b) (Supp. 1988).
16. In People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 755 P.2d 917, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988), the
defendant argued that granting his attorney's motion for change of venue over his own
objections denied him of a vicinage jury, which he contended was a fundamental right
that could not be waived. Id. at 933, 755 P.2d at 926-27, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 477. "Venue
refers to the location where the trial is held, whereas vicinage refers to the area from
which the jury pool is drawn." Id. at 934, 755 P.2d at 927, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 477. See
generally Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA L. REV. 801 (1976). In People v. Jones, 9 Cal.
3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973), the court concluded that the vicinage
requirement of the federal sixth amendment was binding upon the states through the
fourteenth amendment. I& at 551, 510 P.2d at 709, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 349. The court had
previously concluded that the California Constitution incorporated the vicinage right.
People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 25 P. 481 (1891). In Guzman, the court held that the
vicinage right is not a personal one, but "belongs to the community as well as to the
accused.... Absent a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial, a
community retains the right to try its'own crimes." Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d at 936-37, 755
P.2d at 929, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 479. Therefore, like venue, the court held that waiver of
vicinage need not be personally made by the defendant to be a valid waiver. Id. at 93839, 755 P.2d at 930, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 480. See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 68, 75 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRAC.
TICE § 87.04(4) (Supp. 1988).
17. People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 407-08, 754 P.2d 184, 195-96, 247 .Cal. Rptr. 137,
149 (1988) (25-minute limit imposed by the court as a scheduling tool but not enforced); People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1104-05, 755 P.2d 960, 1003-04, 248 Cal. Rptr.
510, 554-55 (1988) (court curtailed questioning about either the state of the law or conclusion regarding the merits of the case). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 410-415 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law,
§§ 2997-2998 (1985); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law, pt. 1, § 3345 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 4
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.05(1)(b), (c) (Supp. 1988).
18. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1004-07, 755 P.2d 1017, 1028-30, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 579-81 (1988) (co-defendants forced to agree in the exercise of joint peremptory challenges); People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 58, 753 P.2d 1, 18-19, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209,
227 (1988) (use of peremptory challenges to remove those with qualms about the death
penalty). See B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 422-423 (1963 & Supp.
1985); see also 21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw §§ 3017-3023 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.05(1)(b) (Supp. 1988).

19. People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 58-59, 753 P.2d 1, 19-20, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 227-28
(1988) (juror did not disclose during voir dire that her brother was accidentally shot
and killed on a hunting trip); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 948, 755 P.2d 917, 936,
248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 486-87 (1988) (jurors note-taking and cautionary instructions); People v. Siripongs, 45 Cal. 3d 548, 570-73, 754 P.2d 1306, 318-20, 247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 741-43
(1988) (juror's mother relayed response from her own attorney to answer her daughter's question regarding the defense resting its case); People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d
86, 119-20, 753 P.2d 37, 57-58, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 265-66 (1988) (jurors taking notes at
trial pursuant to Penal Code section 1137 and not given cautionary instruction regarding distraction and reliance thereon). See B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 517-524 (1963 & Supp. 1985).
20. People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 404-06, 754 P.2d 184, 193-94, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137,
146-47 (1988) (both parties stipulated to the necessary replacement of a juror after deliberations began, and instruction was given pursuant to Penal Code section 1089 to be-
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ciency 22 of evidence; error in jury instructions; 2 3 ineffective assist-

gin deliberation anew); see generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 424-426 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3026 (1985 & Supp.
1988).
21. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1007-15, 755 P.2d 1017, 1031-36, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 581-87 (1988) (court allowed introduction of co-defendant's extrajudicial
statements and testimony regarding rape, despite defendant's objections pursuant to
Evidence Code section 352); People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 679-89, 755 P.2d 253, 26168, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77-84 (1988) (court excluded evidence offered by defendant to
prove state of mind, asserting diminished capacity and insanity due to post-traumatic
stress disorder); People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 777-79, 755 P.2d 310, 326-27, 248
Cal. Rptr. 126, 143-44 (1988) (prosecutor introduced prior incriminating statements
made by an accomplice of the defendant and his girlfriend pursuant to Evidence Code
sections 791(a) & 1236); People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 54-58, 753 P.2d 1, 16-18, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 209, 224-27 (1988) (prosecutor used evidence of three prior felony convictions to
demonstrate defendant's prior use of force and violence); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d
915, 939-41, 755 P.2d 917, 930-32, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 480-82 (1988) (prosecutor introduced testimony of District Attorney on why defendant's accomplice received total immunity in exchange for her testimony); People v. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 171-72, 753
P.2d 629, 645-46, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 689-90 (1988) (prosecutor introduced rape victim's
initial statement under spontaneous-declaration exception to hearsay pursuant to Evidence Code section 1240); People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 238-40, 753 P.2d 669, 676-77,
246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 721-22 (1988) (pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, court excluded videotapes of an interview defendant underwent while hypnotized by psychiatrist); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 322-24, 753 P.2d 1082, 1092-93, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886,
896-97 (1988) (prosecutor introduced photographs and serological evidence); People v.
Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1076-81, 755 P.2d 960, 985-88, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 535-39 (1988)
(court overruled defendant's suppression motion regarding extrajudicial confessions
and searches of his person and property); People v. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d 867, 878-81, 755
P.2d 355, 361-64, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 177-79 (1988) (prosecutor introduced, pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1101, evidence of defendant's other crimes to prove lewd intent
and intent to kill); People v. Siripongs, 45 Cal. 3d 548, 573-75, 754 P.2d 1306, 1320-21,
247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 743-44 (1988) (court admitted defendant's statement to police officer, tape recording, and transcript of defendant's telephone conversation while at police station); People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 101-11, 114-16, 753 P.2d 37, 45-52, 54-55,
246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 253-60, 62-64 (1988) (prosecutor introduced (1) statement by murdered victim to prove state of mind pursuant to Evidence Code section 1250; (2) statement by defendant prior to the robbery-murder of a planned trip to Asia as financial
motive for the robbery pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101; and (3) nine photos of
the victim taken when alive, when discovered by the police, and during the autopsy
over objections pursuant to Evidence Code section 352); People v. Warren, 45 Cal. 3d
471, 484-86, 754 P.2d 218, 226-27, 247 Cal. Rptr. 172, 180-81 (1988) (prosecutor introduced evidence that witnesses were reluctant to testify, and had been told not to testify by family). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 431-442
(1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw §§.3129-3175 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 4
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 83.04 (Supp. 1988).
22. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1015-16, 755 P.2d 1017, 1036-37, 248 Cal.
Rptt. 568, 587-88 (1988); People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 841-42, 755 P.2d 894, 900-01, 248
Cal. Rptr. 444, 451 (1988); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 324-26, 753 P.2d 1082, 1093-94,
246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 897-98 (1988); People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1081-1082, 755 P.2d
960, 988-89, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 539 (1988); People v. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 625, 754 P.2d
1070, 1080-81, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 584 (1988). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA

ance of counsel; 24 conflict of interest; 25 and defendant's right to be
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 683-685 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL. JuR. 3D CriminalLaw
§§ 3248-3268 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
23. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1016-19, 755 P.2d 1017, 1037-39, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 588-89 (1988) (instructions on proximate cause, unanimous agreement of jurors on actus reus, and elements of robbery); People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 689-96,
755 P.2d 253, 268-73, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 84-89 (1988) (defendant asserted that an instruction on "presumption of consciousness ... creates a mandatory, rebuttable presumption that the jury would have understood as shifting to defendant the burden of
proving unconsciousness"); People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 781-91, 793, 755 P.2d
310, 329-37, 248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 146-54 (1988) (conflicting instructions given on evaluation of accomplice testimony, defendant's failure to deny or explain certain evidence,
conspiracy instructions, and refusal to instruct on lesser-related offenses); People v.
Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 59-65, 753 P.2d 1, 20-24, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 228-32 (1988) (ambiguous
instruction regarding necessity that jury find an accomplice intended to participate in
criminal act as mandated by People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 674 P.2d 1318, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 60 (1984)); People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 846-47, 755 P.2d 894, 903-04, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 444, 451-55 (1988) (defendant alleged incomplete instruction given on malice and
diminished capacity); People v. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 163-67, 753 P.2d 629, 638-42,
246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 683-86 (1988) (seven alleged errors including the omission of the
word "not" from one instruction); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 408-09, 754 P.2d 184,
196, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 149 (1988) (conflict in instructions on whether accomplice testimony must be corroborated); People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1109-13, 755 P.2d 960,
1006-10, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 557-60 (1988) (instructions on malice and provocation); People v. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d 867, 881-83, 755 P.2d 355, 363-64, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 179-81
(1988) (instruction on defendant's failure to disclose witnesses and interview evidence);
People v. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 626-29, 754 P.2d 1070, 1081-83, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 584-86
(1988) (Beeman error, and instructions on accomplices, flight, and general intent); People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 118-19, 753 P.2d 37, 56-57, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 264-65
(1988) (defendant argued that court should sua sponte give instruction regarding inherent lack of credibility of jailhouse informants); People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 1127,
1144-45, 751 P.2d 901, 912-13, 245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 647 (1988) (instructions on flight, and
failure to instruct sua sponte to view informant testimony with distrust). See generally
B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 468-495 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3049-3103 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.05(1)(e) (Supp. 1988).
24. The defendants often argued that trial error was the result of ineffective counsel. People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 707, 755 P.2d 253, 280-81, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 96-97
(1988) (failure to object to alleged improper statements of prosecutor); People v. Dyer,
45 Cal. 3d 26, 52-54, 67-68, 753 P.2d 1, 15-16, 25, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 223-24, 233-34 (1988)
(counsel failed to investigate two potential defense witnesses prior to trial, and to object to alleged improper statements of prosecutor at trial); People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d
259, 278-83, 753 P.2d 1052, 1063-66, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 12-15 (1988) (removal of dual representation overburdened remaining counsel); People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 237-38,
753 P.2d 669, 676, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 720-21 (1988) (motion to suppress defendant's incriminating statements was not renewed by defendant's attorney); People v. Rich, 45
Cal. 3d 1036, 1096-1103, 755 P.2d 960, 998-1003, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 549-54 (1988) (sixteen
asserted instances, including a stipulation to polygraph results, disclosure of parts of
suppressed confession, and adequacy of attorney's argument); People v. Williams, 44
Cal. 3d 1127, 1142-43, 751 P.2d 901, 911, 245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 645 (1988) (counsel failed to
assert a diminished capacity defense). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE §§ 356-379 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 21692175 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE §§ 87.04(3),

87.06(3) (Supp. 1988).
25. People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 774-77, 755 P.2d 310, 324-26, 248 Cal. Rptr.
126, 141-43 (1988) (motion to recuse made by co-defendant because defendant's counsel
previously had represented the other on a prior murder charge that was dismissed);
People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 280-83, 753 P.2d 1052, 1064-66, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13-15
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present at various stages of the proceedings,

26

among others.

27

The court reached one of four conclusions in resolving these issues:
the defendant failed to preserve his objection at trial; the trial court
committed no error; assuming error, there was no prejudice; or error
28
actually occurred, but without prejudice.

III.

SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE ISSUES

The court was also unanimous in affirming the finding of at least
one special circumstance 29 against each defendant. The asserted er(1988) (conflict between defendant and counsel about the defendant testifying at trial,
and general uncooperative behavior at trial); People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1082-83,
755 P.2d 960, 989, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 530-40 (1988) (District Attorney, retained as special prosecutor after election defeat, shared office space with defendant's co-counsel in
landlord-tenant relationship with defendant's knowledge and approval). See generally
21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw §§ 2179-2181 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
26. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1019-21, 755 P.2d 1017, 1039-40, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 590-91 (1988) (defendant and counsel waived presence at rereading of testimony to jury after the start of deliberations); People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 845-46,
755 P.2d 894, 907-08, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 458 (1988) (defendant voluntarily waived presence at any stage allowable so long as court deemed him adequately represented by
counsel); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 406-07, 754 P.2d 184, 194-95, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137,
147-48 (1988) (defendant waived right to be present during requested rereadings of testimony by the jury after the deliberations had started). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 388-392 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 19 CAL. JUR. 3D
CriminalLaw §§ 2095-2109 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
27. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of prosecutorial
misconduct. Other alleged trial errors included: (1) Miranda violations and self-incrimination, People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 842-43, 755 P.2d 894, 901-02, 248 Cal. Rptr.
444, 451-52 (1988) (shackling of the defendant at trial and during interviews); People v.
Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 236-38, 753 P.2d 669, 675-76, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719-21 (1988);
People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1099-1100, 755 P.2d 960, 100, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 551
(1988); People v. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 629-30, 754 P.2d 1070, 1083-84, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573,
586-87 (1988); People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 1127, 1138-42, 751 P.2d 901, 908-11, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 635, 642-45 (1988); (2) narrative testimony by defendant and prosecutor's comment thereon, People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 941-48, 755 P.2d 917, 932-36, 248 Cal.'
Rptr. 467, 482-86 (1988); (3) prosecutor's compliance with discovery requests, People v.
Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d 867, 883-85, 755 P.2d 355, 364-66, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 181-82 (1988);
(4) denial of defendant's motion for continuance, People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 84445, 755 P.2d 894, 902, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 452-53 (1988); (5) validity of the arrest warrant,
admission of the defendant's extrajudicial statements, and curtailment of impeachment
of witness for the prosecution, People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 766-74, 779-81, 755
P.2d 310, 319-24, 327-29, 247 Cal. Rptr. 126, 135-81, 144-46 (1988).
28. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
29. Section 190(a) states that:
[e]very person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, confinement in state prison for life without possibility of parole, or confinement in
state prison for a term of 25 years to life. The penalty to be applied shall be
determined as provided in Sections 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, 190.5.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). Section 190.1 provides for separate phases to determine the defendant's guilt and special circumstances, and the truth

rors in this phase included findings of "excessive" multiplemurders; 30 Carlos error;31 improper finding of a special circumstance;32 "overlap" of special circumstances; 33 admissibility and suffiof the special circumstances. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1988). Section 190.2(a)
states that with the finding of any one of 19 listed special circumstances, the penalty
for first degree murder will be death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1988). Section 190.3 regulates the penal phase
of the trial, which authorized the admission into evidence "any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence," including certain enumerated factors. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988). Section 190.3 concludes:
[a]fter having heard and received all of the evidence, and after having heard
and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of fact shall consider, take
into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of
fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances
outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility
of parole.
Id

See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 1026-1047 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 22

CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3341, 3343 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.05(2)(b) (Supp. 1988).
30. Section 190.2(a)(3) states: "The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (West 1988). In the determination of special circumstances, the juyrors sometimes improperly found the existence of multiple-murder as to each victim,
instead of one multiple-murder encompassing all victims. See People v. Dyer, 45 Cal.
3d 26, 69, 753 P.2d 1, 26, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 234 (1988); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386,
409-10, 754 P.2d 184, 196-97, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 150 (1988); People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d
1036, 1113-14, 755 P.2d 960, 1010, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 560-61 (1988); People v. Warren, 45
Cal. 3d 471, 489, 754 P.2d 218, 729, 247 Cal. Rptr. 172, 189 (1988); People v. Williams, 44
Cal. 3d 1127, 1146, 751 P.2d 901, 913, 245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 647 (1988).
31. In Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 153-54, 672 P.2d 862, 877, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 79, 98-99 (1983), the court held that a finding of felony-murder special circumstance is not valid unless the court instructs on intent to kill. Carlos was overruled in
People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1147, 742 P.2d 1306, 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 610-11
(1987), where the court held that the instruction is unnecessary unless there is evidence that the defendant may have been a mere accomplice, rather than the actual
killer. Id. at 1138-39, 742 P.2d at 1325-26, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05. The court has refused to reconsider this position. See People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 708, 755 P.2d
253, 281, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 97 (1988); People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 793-94, 755
P.2d 310, 337-38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 154 (1988); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 949,
755 P.2d 917, 937, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 487 (1988); People v. Hamilton, 45 Cal. 3d 351, 36364, 753 P.2d 1109, 1117, 247 Cal. Rptr. 31, 38 (1988); People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227,
252-53, 753 P.2d 669, 685-86, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 730 (1988); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d
306, 326-27, 753 P.2d 1082, 1094, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 898-99 (1988); People v. Robbins, 45
Cal. 3d 867, 885, 755 P.2d 355, 366, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 182 (1988); People v. Siripongs, 45
Cal. 3d 548, 575-76, 754 P.2d 1306, 1321-22, 247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 745 (1988); People v.
Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 117, 753 P.2d 37, 55-56, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 264-65 (1988); People v. Warren, 45 Cal. 3d 471, 486-88, 754 P.2d 218, 227-29, 247 Cal. Rptr. 172, 181-82
(1988); People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 1127, 1145-46, 751 P.2d 901, 913, 245 Cal. Rptr. 635,
647 (1988).
32. People v. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 630-32, 754 P.2d 1070, 1084-85, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573,
587-88 (1988) (court set aside special circumstance findings of murder for financial
gain, heinous murder, and witness-murder, but affirmed kidnapping for robbery felony-murder).
33. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1024-25, 755 P.2d 1017, 1042, 248 Cal. Rptr.
568, 593 (1988) (robbery and kidnapping not separately charged regarding felony-mur-
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ciency of evidence;34 and instructional error.3 5 The egregious nature
of the offenses and the substantial evidence against each defendant
allowed the court to affirm the finding of at least one special circumstance, thus preserving the imposition of death as a penalty.
The court stated that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has yet
to enunciate the test of reversible error when an element of an offense or special circumstance finding is omitted from instructions to

the jury." 36 Therefore, pursuant to Chapman v. California,37 "[t]he
question is whether, on the whole record ... the error ...[is] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."38

IV. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
A.

Factor (7)
A common error asserted at the penalty phase of the trial pertains

to the instructions on matters subject to consideration by the jury;39
Specifically, the defendants asserted error in the instructions associder); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 953, 755 P.2d 917, 939-40, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 490
(1988) (burglary and robbery special circumstances).
34. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 987, 1024, 755 P.2d 1017, 1040-42, 248 Cal. Rptr.
568, 591-93 (1988); People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 795, 755 P.2d 310, 338, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 126, 155 (1988); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 952-53, 755 P.2d 917, 939-40, 248
Cal. Rptr. 467, 490 (1988); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 327-28, 753 P.2d 1082, 1095,
246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 899 (1988); People v. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d 867, 885-86, 755 P.2d 355,
366, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 182-83 (1988).
35. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1025-26, 755 P.2d 1017, 1042-43, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 593-94 (1988) (robbery and kidnapping special circumstances); People v.
Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 410-16, 754 P.2d 184, 197-201, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 150-55 (1988)
(omission and conflict of instruction regarding murder of a peace officer).
36. People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 411, 754 P.2d 184, 198, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 151
(1988).
37. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
38. People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 414, 754 P.2d 184, 200, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 153
(1988) (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1988)).
39. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1032-33, 755 P.2d 1017, 1047-48, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 598-99 (1988); People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 712-13, 755 P.2d 253, 283-85,
248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 100-01 (1988); People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 854-55, 755 P.2d 894,
909-10, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 459-60 (1988); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 956-58, 755
P.2d 917, 942-43, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 492-93 (1988); People v. Hamilton, 45 Cal. 3d 351,
371-72, 753 P.2d 1109, 1122-23, 247 Cal. Rptr. 31, 43-44 (1988); People v. Heishman, 45
Cal. 3d 147, 187-89, 753 P.2d 629, 655-57, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 700-01 (1988); People v.
Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 296-99, 753 P.2d 1052, 1076-77, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 24-25 (1988); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 417-19, 754 P.2d 184, 201-03, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 155-57 (1988);
People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 346-47, 753 P.2d 1082, 1107, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 911-12
(1988); People v. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d 867, 886-87, 755 P.2d 355, 367, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172,
183-84 (1988); People v. Siripongs, 45 Cal. 3d 548, 580-81, 754 P.2d 1306, 1325, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 748 (1988); People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 2d 1127, 1147-48, 751 P.2d 901, 914, 245
Cal. Rptr. 635, 648-49 (1988).

ated with "factor (k)" of section 190.3.40 In People v. Easley,41 the
court held that the unadorned instruction 42 could leave the jury with
the misunderstanding that the defendant's mental condition, character evidence, and general background played no part in their sentencing discretion.43 Such ambiguity would violate the United States
Constitution; 44 thus, in all cases after Easley, the court has required
express instructions to the jury allowing for the consideration of such
evidence as related to the specific crime.45 The court also has held
that cases decided prior to Easley, where the expanded factor (k) instruction would not have been given, would be decided by looking to
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988). This section states in relevant part
that "[i]n determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the
following factors if relevant: . . .(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime." See generally
22 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3342-3346 (1985) (discussion of penalty hearing procedure); 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 1034, 1042 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE §§ 87.01, 87.02(6), 87.03(3), 87.05(1)(5) (Supp.
1988).
41. 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983).
42. CALIFORNIA APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Criminal) No. 8.84.1 (West 1979)

[hereinafter CALJIC]. The unmodified version read:
In determining which penalty is to be imposed on [each] defendant, you shall
consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the
trial of this case, (except as you may be hereafter instructed]. You shall consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable:
... (k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (West 1979). The 1986 revision expands factor (k) to read:
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime [and any sympathetic or other
aspect of the defendant's character or record [that the defendant offers] as a
basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for
which he is on trial. You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in
the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this principle.].
CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (West Supp. 1987).
43. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d at 878 n.10, 671 P.2d at 826 n.10, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 322 n.10.
44. The Supreme Court, in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), held:
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but
the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating-factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
Id. at 604 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 110-16 (1982).
45. In People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 753 P.2d 1082, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988), the
court explained:
[a]lthough we impliedly held in Easley that section 190.3(k) was not unconstitutional in itself ...we nevertheless recognized that when delivered in an instruction the statutory language might mislead the jury as to the scope of its
sentencing discretion and responsibility under the federal Constitution. ...
For this reason we directed trial courts thereafter to inform the jury that they
may consider in mitigation not only factor (k) but also "any other 'aspect of
[the] defendant's character or record ...that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.'"
IS at 346, 753 P.2d at 1107, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 911 (citing People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d at
878 n.10, 671 P.2d at 826 n.10, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 322 n.10).
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the entire record to determine whether the jury properly understood
the scope of matters subject to consideration.46
In the cases under review in this survey, the court upheld no factor
(k) challenges. In examining the trial courts' instructions, the court
analyzed the prosecutors' arguments, and found that most arguments
did not involve removal of mental condition and character evidence
from the jury's sentencing discretion. Instead, the prosecutors properly argued that the evidence on these points carried little weight.
The court further found that arguments from. many of the defense
counsels cured any misconceptions created by the instructions and
47
the prosecutors' arguments.
48
In People v. Lucky, the court placed one limitation on the matters which the jury may consider. The court stated that the United
States Supreme Court "has recently made clear that an instruction
prohibiting'mere' or 'factually untethered' sympathy as a sentencing
consideration is constitutionally proper." 49 This being so, "an instruction urging the relevance of such 'untethered' sympathy is not required.... Moreover, insofar as an 'ignore consequences' instruction
'can be understood by the jury in the same light as an admonition to
disregard sympathy' . . . the Constitution does not forbid it."50
Justice Broussard twice dissented from the affirmance of the death
penalty because of factor (k) error.51 While agreeing with the majority in its interpretation of Easley, his dissent in People v. Odle argued
its application to the facts.5 2 However, his dissent in People v. Guz46. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 544 n.17, 709 P.2d 440, 459 n.17, 220 Cal. Rptr.
637, 656 n.17 (1985), vacated on other grounds, California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
47. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of harmless error.
48. 45 Cal. 3d 259, 753 P.2d 1052, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988).
49. Id. at 298, 753 P.2d at 1077, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (citing California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 544-45 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
50. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 298, 753 P.2d at 1077, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
51. People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 755 P.2d 917, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1988).
52. Justice Broussard stated:
The prosecutor unequivocally and erroneously stated that factor (k) was inapplicable because it related to the circumstances of the crimes and there was
nothing mitigating or extenuating about the commission of the crimes. He
never retreated from this position .... I conclude that the prosecutor's argument in the absence of a clarifying instruction improperly precluded a finding
of any mitigating circumstance unless the jury found that the brain surgery
and its results affected defendant's capacity at the time of the offenses.
The error is prejudicial in that it probably took from the jury the crucial
issue presented by the strong mitigating evidence.
Odle, 45 Cal. 3d at 427, 429, 754 P.2d at 208-09, 210, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 162, 163-64 (footnote omitted) (Broussard, J., dissenting).

man attacked not only the majority's view that the prosecutor cured
both the instructional ambiguity and his own improper argument, but
also to the conclusion that the defense counsel's argument cured any
error.53 Justice Broussard concluded that a jury would resolve any
conflict in interpretation between the prosecutor and defense counsel
in favor of the prosecutor.5 4
B. Brown Error
Similar to the way a factor (k) error takes away juror discretion as
to matters considered in mitigation, Brown5 5 error alleges that the
jurors were misled about the nature of the weighing process mandated by Penal Code section 190.3.56 The United States Supreme
53. Justice Broussard asked: "I can understand how a judicial admonition may
cure improper argument, but how can a comment by defense counsel do the job? At
best, all defense counsel can do is raise a conflict, leaving the jury with two contradictory interpretations of the law, one correct and one erroneous." Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d at
978, 755 P.2d at 957, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 978-79, 755 P.2d at 957, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Justice Broussard, quoting anearlier appellate case, stated that:
[d]efense counsel and the prosecuting officials do not stand as equals before
the jury. Defense counsel are known to be advocates for the defense. The
prosecuting attorneys are government officials and clothed with the dignity
and prestige of their office. What they say to the jury is necessarily weighted
with that prestige.
Id. at 976, 755 P.2d at 957, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (quoting People v. Tale, 111 Cal. App.
2d 650, 677, 245 P.2d 633, 649 (1952)).
55. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 538-44, 709 P.2d 440, 453-59, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637,
650-56 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987). In
Brown, the court concluded that unadorned instructions pursuant to section 190.3
could mislead the jury in its sentencing discretion because of the "shall" proviso following the factors to be weighed. Id. at 541, 709 P.2d at 456, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
While the cases decided thereafter were to have clarifications in the instructions, the
cases decided prior to Brown would be determined individually by examining the record as a whole to determine if the jury was indeed misled. Id. Brown error was alleged in People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 856-57, 755 P.2d 894, 910-11, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444,
460-61 (1988); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 958-60, 755 P.2d 917, 943-45, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 467, 493-95 (1988); People v. Hamilton, 45 Cal. 3d 351, 370-71, 753 P.2d 1109, 112122, 247 Cal. Rptr. 31, 43 (1988); People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 299-301, 753 P.2d 1052,
1078-79, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 27-28 (1988); People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 253-58, 753 P.2d
669, 686-89, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 730-33 (1988); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 419-21, 754
P.2d 184, 203-05, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 157-58 (1988); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 345,
753 P.2d 1082, 1106-07, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 910-11 (1988); People v. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d
867, 889-88, 755 P.2d 355, 367-68, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 184 (1988); People v. Silva, 45 Cal.
3d 604, 639-40, 754 P.2d 1070, 1090, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 593-94 (1988); People v. Siripongs,
45 Cal. 3d 548, 581-82, 754 P.2d 1306, 1325-56, 247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 749 (1988); People v.
Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 135-37, 753 P.2d 37, 68-69, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 276-77 (1988);
People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 1127, 1148-49, 751 P.2d 901, 914-15, 245 Cal. Rptr. 635,
649-50 (1988).
56. After listing the factors the jury is to consider in aggravation and mitigation,
section 190.3 concludes:
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after having heard
and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of fact shall consider, take
into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of

[Vol. 16: 431, 1989]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi,5 7 stated that "it is constitutionally
impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a
sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere."58 In analyzing instructions pursuant to section 190.359 with
the mandate of Caldwell, the court's concern is that a juror may be
misled about the scope of his sentencing discretion "as (i) merely the
'counting' of factors and then (ii) reaching an 'automatic' decision,
with no exercise of personal responsibility for deciding, by his own
standards, which penalty was appropriate." 60 In other words, the juror is not merely to count factors in aggravation and mitigation and
fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a
sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) (emphasis added). See generally B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 538 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.05[5][ a] (Supp. 1988); White, Juror Decision Making in the
Capital Penalty Trial, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. J. 113 (1987); Note, Discretion and the
Constitutionalityof the New Death Penalty Statute, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690 (1974) (constitutionality of new death penalty statutes involving juror discretion).
57. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
58. Id. at 328-29.
59. CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (West 1979). The unmodified version read:
It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be imposed
on [each] defendant.... After having heard all of the evidence, and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take
into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed.
If yot conclude that the aggravatingcircumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole.
Id. (emphasis added). The revised version expands the italicized portion:
The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a
mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the
arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign
whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of
the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you simply determine under the relevant evidence which penalty
is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a
judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence (circumstances) is (are) so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.
CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (West Supp. 1987).
60. People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 256, 753 P.2d 669, 688, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 732
(1988).

conclude that the side with more factors carries greater weight. Instead, these factors should be merely a guide to returning a death
sentence after coming "face to face with the question of whether, in
the personal moral judgment of each juror, death is the appropriate
61
punishment in that case."
The court overturned the death penalty in People v. Milner62 because of an uncured Brown error.6 3 In his opinion for the unanimous
court, Justice Panelli stated that "[i]n the instant case, the prosecutor
did not so much shift the jury's responsibility as negate its existence."64 Although the defense counsel attempted to cure the error,
"[i]n essence the jurors were told that the 'awesome responsibility'
for the life and death determination did not rest with them." 65 The
court affirmed both the guilt and the finding of special circumstances, but overturned the imposition of death as the penalty. 66
Justices Mosk and Broussard dissented from the affirmance of the
death penalty in People v. Guzman,67 because they believed that a
Brown error occurred. 68 Justice Mosk wrote that the prosecutor
"misled the jury as to the nature of the weighing process... [and] as
69
to the nature of the ultimate decision they were call on to make."
He also argued that the prosecutor's closing argument alone violated
61. People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 958, 755 P.2d 917, 943, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 494
(1988) (emphasis in original) (citing People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1276-77, 729 P.2d
115, 148-49, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 882-83 (1986)).
62. 45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d 669, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988).
63. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of harmless error.
64. Id. at 254, 753 P.2d at 687, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
65. Id. at 257, 753 P.2d at 688, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 733. The prosecutor's closing argument included the following:
I submit to you you're not to do or arrive at what you, as individuals, feel is
just or true in this particular case, based upon your own standards, because if
you do so, you're taking upon each one of you individually a burden that the
law does not require.... I'll
read for you the paragraph, the law which you
have sworn to follow. The law that protects you, as individuals,from the
weight of your individualprejudices or feelings, personalfeelings, in the case.
The law states, if you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death .... This
gives you a chance, as jurors, to interject your own personal feelings. But
when you interject your own personalfeelings, when you get to that stage,
then I submit to you you're stepping outside of the protection of the law and
taking upon your shoulders a weight that you, as jurors, are not required
under the law to shoulder in this particularcase.
Id. at 254-55, 753 P.2d at 687, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 257-58, 753 P.2d at 688-89, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 733. The defendant's counsel
argued that the prosecutor "asked you to hide behind this law, and I'm not asking you
to hide. And I don't think any of you should hide behind the law. You people are the
perpetrators of the law. You never hide behind any of our laws." Id. at 256, 753 P.2d
at 688, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
67. 45 Cal. 3d 915, 755 P.2d 917, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988).
68. Id. at 969, 979, 755 P.2d at 950, 957, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 501, 508 (1988) (Mosk, J.,
and Broussard, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 972-73, 755 P.2d at 953, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 503 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The
prosecutor argued:
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the directive in Caldwell v. Mississippi.70 Justice Broussard joined
the Guzman opinion, independently arguing that Guzman and two
other recent cases having similar instructions and arguments were
decided inconsistently. 7 1 To avoid such inconsistency in the future,
he concluded that when the prosecutor improperly states the nature
of the weighing process, "[w]e probably should insist upon some affirmative indication in the record that the jury understood that it
must decide appropriateness during the weighing process; we should
certainly not affirm when the record affirmatively shows that the
72
jury was advised to the contrary."
It's never easy for someone to ask for another man's life. But your burden is
lightened in this case because of the law.
The way the law is set up, as Il explain it to you, the weighted process that
you go through and the fact that if the aggravatingcircumstances outweigh
the mitigating circumstances,you shall return a verdict of death.
It's just that simple. The law lightens your burden in that regard, in the
analysis that you go through.... You simply apply those facts to the law, to
reach the determination;and in doing that the law provides for various factors
for you to consider in reaching your determination.
Id. at 971, 755 P.2d at 952, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
70. Id. The majority stated that the United States Supreme Court, in Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985),
reversed a death sentence because the prosecutor repeatedly and erroneously
informed the jury that it was not the final arbiter of whether death was the
appropriate penalty for the defendant. Instead, the prosecutor [in this case]
told the jury, a reviewing court would assess the record to make sure death
was the appropriate penalty.
Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d at 960 n.12, 755 P.2d at 945 n.12, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 495 n.12.
Although the majority concluded this was no error, Justice Mosk concluded that the
jury did not have "the appropriate awareness of its 'truly awesome responsibility'" as
required pursuant to Caldwell. Id. at 976, 755 P.2d at 955, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 505 (Mosk,
J., dissenting) (quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 341).
71. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d at 979-80, 755 P.2d at 957-58, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09
(Broussard, J., dissenting). The three cases are Guzman, People v. Hendricks, 44 Cal.
3d 635, 749 P.2d 836, 244 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1988), People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d
669, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988). The court overturned the death penalty in Milner, and
affirmed it in Hendricks. Justice Broussard stated:
The prosecutors in each of these three cases are saying basically the same
thing. They are telling the jurors that they do not have the ultimate responsibility to determine whether the defendant should live or die. The law has
taken the sting out of that decision, protected them from that responsibility,
lightened their burden. Their role is a limited one. According to the prosecutors' argument, the jurors are finders of fact, who determine what aggravating
and mitigating factors exist, place them in a scale, and report how the balance
tips.
This argument radically misstates the role of the penalty jury.... If there is
a principled ground to distinguish the three decisions, it does not appear in
our opinions.
Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d at 980-81, 755 P.2d at 958, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
72. Id. at 982, 755 P.2d at 959, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 510 (Broussard, J., dissenting).

Justice Mosk wrote separately in People v. Odle 73 to express his
belief that Brown error very nearly occurred, although he concurred
with the majority. 74 Even though the prosecutor misled the jury,
Justice Mosk concluded that the "defense counsel's argument and
the court's other instructions... plainly disclosed the proper scope of
the jury's sentencing responsibility and discretion and thereby neutralized the prosecutor's comments ....
C

Ramos Error

Ramos error7 6 brought about the reversal of the death penalty verdict in People v. Warren.77 In People v. Ramos,78 the court held that
73. 45 Cal. 3d 386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1988).
74. Id. at 424-25, 754 P.2d at 207, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (Mosk, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 425, 754 P.2d at 207, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (Mosk, J., concurring). The
prosecutor's theme was "[t]he law is that if factors in aggravation outweigh the factors
in mitigation you must impose the death penalty. The language is very clear. It says
'shall.' That means must. You have to. No discretion." Id. at 420 n.18, 754 P.2d at
2021 n.18, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 157 n.18. Three factors cured this error. First, the prosecutor's own argument retreated somewhat from this position "by telling the jury that its
job was to 'decide the appropriate penalty and punishment' for defendant." Id. at 421
n.19, 754 P.2d at 204 n.19, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 158 n.19. Second, the court's instruction
expanded on the standard CALJIC No. 8.84.2 to include:
you are not to simply count up the number of circumstances and decide
whether there are more of one than the other. The final test is the relative
weight of the circumstances not the relative number.
One mitigating circumstance alone can be found by you to balance or outweigh any number of aggravating circumstances.
Id. at 420, 754 P.2d at 204, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 157 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
Finally, the defense counsel's argument clearly stated the jury's correct role:
The real focus on your deliberation, simply stated, is the death penalty necessary for [defendant].... When your foreperson signs the form to kill [defendant] or fix his sentence at life without possibility of parole, it has to be a
decision that each one of you individually believes in.
[Defendant] cannot and must not be executed unless each of you in your
own heart, in your own conscience believe it must happen.
Id. at 421,.754 P.2d at 204-05, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 158 (emphasis omitted).
76. See generally Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: ConstitutionalAccuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1037, 1101-08 (1988); Clary,
Voting for Death: LingeringDoubts About the Constitutionalityof Texas' CapitalSentencing Procedure, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 353, 364 (1987); California Supreme Court Survey, The Briggs Instruction Violates Due Process, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 167, 212-14
(1982); Note, ProsecutorialMisconduct: The Limitations Upon the Prosecutor'sRole as
an Advocate, 14 SuFFoLK L.J. 1095, 1123-25 (1980) ("suggesting that a reviewing authority might suspend the sentence or reduce the punishment also improperly usurps
the function of the jury"); Note, Is the Briggs Instruction Constitutional?,5 WHITTIER
L. REV. 457 (1983) (addressing the decision in Ramos); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.02(6) (Supp. 1988).
77. 45 Cal. 3d 471, 754 P.2d 218, 247 Cal. Rptr. 172. The objectionable charge was
"[y]ou are instructed that under the State Constitution, a governor is empowered to
grant a reprieve, pardon or commutation after sentence following conviction of a
crime. Under this power a governor may in the future commute or modify a sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole." Id. at 489, 754 P.2d at 229, 247
Cal. Rptr. 183; see 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide.§ 513 (1968 & Supp. 1988); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 3342 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
78. 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984).
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the so-called Briggs instruction, 79 which emphasized the governor's
power to commute or modify a life sentence without the possibility of
parole, was a violation of "fundamental fairness" because the jury
may be influenced by improper consideration.8 0 This instruction improperly allowed the jury to speculate and it was "serious error."8 1
In contrast, the court in People v. Hamilton82 held that a similar
Briggs instruction given by the trial court8 3 was erroneous, but that
the error was cured by the subsequent instruction to ignore the possibility of commutation.8 4 While the court did not find the residual
Briggs instruction free from error, any error was "non-prejudicial"
and the jury was not led "to indulge in irrelevant and improper
speculation. "85
Justice Broussard, in his dissent, argued that the Briggs error was
prejudicial. 86 He reasoned that the subsequent instructions, rather
than curing any error, were confusing and contained errors themselves.8 7 Far from elimination prejudice, they only served to emphasize "the commutation power and confused the jury into believing
that the power was an important matter."88
Further, in People v. Poggi,8 9 a comment by the prosecutor that
"[s]ome Supreme Court decision may come down saying that leaving
someone in jail without possibility of parole is a cruel and unjust
punishment and these people must be given a parole date," 90 was
held to invite the jury to improperly speculate. 91 However, defense
counsel's objection and a curative instruction by the court cured any
79. CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (West 1979). The Briggs instruction reads in full:
You are instructed that under the state Constitution, a governor is empowered
to grant a reprieve, pardon or commutation after sentence following conviction of a crime. Under this power a governor may in the future commute or
modify a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole to a lesser
sentence that would include the possibility of parole.
This instruction was subsequently deleted. CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (West Supp. 1987).
80. Warren, 45 Cal. 3d at 489, 754 P.2d at 229-30, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
81. Id. at 489, 754 P.2d at 230, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
82. 45 Cal. 3d 351, 753 P.2d 1109, 247 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1988).
83. Id., at 373, 753 P.2d at 1123, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
84. Id., at 375, 753 P.2d at 1124-25, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
85. Id. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text regarding harmless error.
86. Hamilton, 45 Cal. 3d at 380, 753 P.2d at 1128, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
87. Id. at 382-83, 753 P.2d at 1130, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
88. Id. at 384-85, 753 P.2d at 1131, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
89. 45 Cal. 3d 306, 753 P.2d 1082, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988).
90. Id. at 336, 753 P.2d at 1101, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
91. Id. (Cf. People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 155-59, 689 P.2d 430, 441-44, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 811-14 (1984) (holding that even an accurate Briggs instruction would cause
improper jury speculation).

possible harm.92
Interestingly, in People v. Thompson,93 a kind of reverse Ramos issue appears.94 The defense counsel asked for an instruction which
would have told the jury that if they decided on the death sentence it
would be carried out, or if they chose life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, the defendant would not be released.95 The
court held that this instruction invited the same kind of improper
speculation as did the normal Briggs instruction.9 6 Furthermore, it
was held that it is as incorrect to instruct the jury that its sentence
"will inexorably be carried out" as it is to give the Briggs instruction
which suggests that jurors "need not take their responsibility as seriously because the ultimate determination of penalty rests elsewhere." 97 Therefore, it was not error for the judge to refuse to give
the requested instruction.9 8
D.

ProsecutorialMisconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct 99 was an issue raised, in one form or an92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at 336, 753 P.2d at 1101, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
45 Cal. 3d 86, 753 P.2d 37, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1988).
Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d at 129, 753 P.2d at 64, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
Id.
Id. at 130-31, 753 P.2d at 64-65, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
Id.
Id. at 131, 753 P.2d at 65, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74.
See generally B.L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.2(b) (1988); J.
LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, Improper Argument in Murder Cases, § 9.24
(Supp. 1988); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Punishmentfor Crimes §§ 1206-1206E
(Supp. 1985); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 229 (1977 & Supp. 1988); 24A C.J.S. CriminalLaw
§ 1902 (1962 & Supp. 1988); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3340-3347 (1985 & Supp.
1988). For an overview of death penalty concerns, see Death Penalty Symposium, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 865 (1985).
"Prosecutorial misconduct is cause for reversal only when it is 'reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred had the district attorney refrained from the comment attacked by the defendant.'" People v. Milner, 45
Cal. 3d 227, 245, 753 P.2d 669, 680-81, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 725 (1988) (quoting People v.
Beivelman 70 Cal. 2d 60, 75, 447 P.2d 913, 921, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 529 (1968). It is "generally recognized that misconduct of counsel will not afford a basis for reversal unless
it appears that the acts complained of influenced the verdict and resulted in substantial prejudice to appellant." 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1902(1) at 997 n.40 (1962 &
Supp. 1988).
See also Dershowitz, Forward to J. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT at ix
(1985): "As the Supreme Court begins to turn its traffic light from red to yellow and
even green, prosecutors will be deterred less often--some might say encouraged-to
adopt an 'ends justifies the means' approach." Id. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct
by Prosecutorsand Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REv. 629, 735 (1972). ("It is unfortunate
that the public has come to associate courtroom disruption almost exclusively with the
misconduct of defendant and defense attorneys. In my view, the misconduct of the
prosecutor and trial judges presents a much more pressing problem. Although it probably occurs no more frequently than defense misconduct, it is far more damaging to
the cause of justice."); Singer, ForensicMisconduct by Federal Prosecutors-andHow
it Grew, 20 ALA. L. REv. 227 (1968); Steele, Unethical Prosecutorsand Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965 (1985) (discussion of guidelines for prosecutorial sanctions);

[Vol. 16: 431, 1989]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

other, in all nineteen cases included in this survey. Although raised
in the guilt phase of seven 00 of the cases surveyed, the court found
no reversible error in any case.10 1 Of the two cases overturned by
the court, 0 2 only in People v. Milner,103 did prosecutorial misconduct
in the penalty phase play a part in the court's decision to overturn
the death penalty verdict.10 4 In analyzing these cases, the asserted
misconduct encompassed distinct subject matter areas.
E.

Failureto Object

Often, the first hurdle that a defendant had to clear in seeking a
reversal for prosecutorial misconduct was the defendant's failure to
6
objectlos The court followed the rule in People v. GreenlO
that if
the defendant failed to object to any error that could have been cured
by an instruction from the trial judge, the point was waived.' 0 7 As
Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a
Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946 (1954) (discussing judicial approaches to prosecutor discipline); Note, ProsecutorIndiscretion:A Result of PoliticalInfluence, 34 IND.
L.J. 477 (1959) (a possible solution to misconduct would be to end the political nature
of the office); Note, ProsecutorialMisconduct: The Limitations upon the Prosecutor's
Role as an Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1095 (1980) (examining conflicts between
the prosecutor's role as an officer of the court and as an advocate).
100. People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 755 P.2d 253, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1988); People
v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 753 P.2d 1, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1988); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal.
3d 915, 755 P.2d 917, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988); People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d
669, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988); People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 755 P.2d 960, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1988); People v. Robbins 45 Cal. 3d 867, 755 P.2d 355, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1988); People v. Warren, 45 Cal. 3d 471, 754 P.2d 218, 247 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1988).
101. See supra notes 13-38 and accompanying text (guilt-phase section), the conduct
was determined to fall in any of four categories: (1) the defendant failed to preserve
his objection at trial; (2) the court's conduct was not error; (3) assuming error, there
was no prejudice; (4) error occurred, but there was no prejudice.
102. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d at 227, 753 P.2d at 669, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 713; Warren, 45 Cal.
3d at 471, 754 P.2d at 218, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
103. 45 Cal. 3d at 227, 753 P.2d at 669, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
104. Id.
105. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1034, 755 P.2d 1017, 1049, 248 Cal. Rptr.
568, 599 (1988); People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 81-82, 753 P.2d 1, 34, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209,
242 (1988); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 947, 755 P.2d 917, 936, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467,
486 (1988); People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 293, 753 P.2d 1052, 1073-74, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1,
22 (1988); People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 244-45, 753 P.2d 669, 680-81, 246 Cal. Rptr.
713, 725; People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 335, 339-40, 753 P.2d, 1082, 1100, 1103, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 888, 904, 907-08 (1988); People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1089, 755 P.2d 960, 993, 248
Cal. Rptr. 510, 544 (1988); People v. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 638, 754 P.2d 1070, 1089, 247
Cal.'Rptr. 573, 593 (1988); People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 114, 124, 753 P.2d 37, 53,
61, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 262, 269 (1988); see 21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 2950.
106. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
107. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also B.L. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.2(b) (1988).

Justice Panelli stated in his majority opinion in People v. Poggi,108
"[s]imply to object or make an assignment of misconduct without
seeking a curative admonition is not enough."1 0 9 Further, the court
stated the purpose for the rule was to allow the trial court to "correct
the abuse and thus, if possible, prevent by suitable instruction the
harmful effect upon the mind of the jury."11o The burden then falls
upon the defendant to show that "any harm threatened by the comment in question was incurable"lI in order for a court of appeal to
reach the "merits of the complaint."nl2 Also, pursuant to the California case, People v. Miranda,11s the court held that the test from
Green applied in the penalty phase as well as in the guilt phase of the
trial.114 In the cases included in this survey, none met the test enunciated in Green for appellate review when the defendant had failed to
15
preserve the point through a timely objection.
F.

Alleged Ineffectiveness of Counsel

An issue closely allied with the failure to object to prosecutorial
misconduct was that of ineffective assistance of counsel." 6 In addressing this issue, the court, citing People v. Pope,"17 placed the burden on the defendant to prove that the assistance of counsel was in
fact ineffective, and that with more effective counsel, a different result was more "reasonably probable,"11s or that there were no plausible tactical reasons for not objecting.11 9 In applying this test, the
108. 45 Cal. 3d 306, 753 P.2d 1082, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988).
109. Id. at 335, 753 P.2d at 1100, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
110. Id. (quoting People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 27, 609 P.2d 468, 483, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1,
16).
111. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at 335, 753 P.2d at 1100, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
112. Id.
113. 44 Cal. 3d 57, 108 n.30, 744 P.2d 1127, 1159 n.30, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 626 n.30
(1987).
114. People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 293, 753 P.2d 1052, 1073, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 22
(1988); Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at 335, 753 P.2d at 1100, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
115. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
116. This issue is also linked with failure to present mitigating evidence. See infra
notes 168-190 and accompanying text.
117. 23 Cal. 3d 412, 425, 590 P.2d 859, 867, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1979); see 2 A.L.R.
4TH 1.
118. People v. Babbit, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 707, 755 P.2d 253, 280, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 96-97
(1988); Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 293, 753 P.2d at 1073, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 22; People v. Milner,
45 Cal. 3d 227, 245, 753 P.2d 669, 681, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 725 (1988); Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at
347, 753 P.2d at 1108, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 912; People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1096, 755
P.2d 960, 998, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 549 (1988). See Comment, Washington v. Strickland&
Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1544 (1983) (risk of burden of proof shifted to the defendant); Note, A New Standard
for Ineffectiveness of Counsel Claims: Commonwealth v. Pierce, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 515
(1988) ("defendant seeking relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
must prove the likelihood that counsel's alleged ineffectiveness prejudiced the outcome of the case."). Id. at 515.
119. See Babbit, 45 Cal. 3d at 707, 755 P.2d at 280, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 97; Milner, 45
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court reached one of three conclusions: first, after examining the record, there was a possible tactical purpose for failing to object;120 or
second, because counsel was not asked to explain his failure to object,
there was a possibility of a "rational tactical purpose" 21 for the failure to object;122 or third, the asserted misconduct did not rise to prejudicial error and an objection would have been futile. 123
The decisions of the court in this area have put defense counsel in
the position of having to object to every perceived instance of
prosecutorial misconduct in order to preserve the point for appeal.
The difficulty for defense counsel is that undue emphasis may be
placed on the comment by the very fact of his objection. Counsel
must weigh this danger against the very real risk that his failure to
object means the point is waived.
G.

1 24

Alleged Improper Argument ConcerningAggravating and
MitigatingFactors

In presenting aggravating and mitigating factors to the jury pursuant to Penal Code section 190.3,125 it is improper for the prosecutor to

argue that the "mere absence of a mitigating factor itself constitute[s]
aggravation ..... 126 In People v. Ainsworth, the court held that
Cal. 3d at 245, 753 P.2d at 681, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 725; Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at 347, 753 P.2d at
1108, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 912; Rich, 45 Cal. 3d at 1096-97, 755 P.2d at 998, 248 Cal. Rptr. at
549; (citing People v. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 584, 659 P.2d 1144, 1151, 189 Cal. Rptr.
855, 862 (1988). See also Denton, Recent Developments in CriminalLaw Practice: The

Effective Assistance of Counsel,

CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION FOR THE BAR

§ 5.7, at 78-79, (Feb. 1988) (court will give high deference to tactical decisions for not
presenting mitigating evidence).
120. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d at 245, 753 P.2d at 681, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 725. ("Defense
counsel would ...have been well within the bounds of reasonable competence had he
chosen to ignore the statements rather than draw attention to them with an objection." Id. See also Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 293, 753 P.2d at 1073, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
121. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d at 581, 659 P.2d at 1149, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
122. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at 347, 753 P.2d at 1108, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 912; Rich, 45 Cal. 3d
at 1097, 755 P.2d at 998, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
123. Babbit, 45 Cal. 3d at 707, 755 P.2d at 280, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 97; People v. Dyer,
45 Cal. 3d 26, 67-68, 753 P.2d 1, 25, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 224 (1988).

124. B.L.

GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

§ 13.2(b)-(b)(1 (pitfalls of the

decision to object and possible remedies); Note, ProsecutorialMisconduct: The Limitations upon the Prosecutor'sRole as an Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1095, 1129-31
(1980) ("[a]lthough these factors weigh against objecting too frequently, the defense
takes a great risk by remaining silent.... Accordingly, upon failure to enter an appropriate objection, defense counsel assumes the significant burden of proving to the appellate court that the error resulted in a substantial injustice or an unfair trial." Id. at
1131).

125.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 190.3 (West 1988).

126. People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1034, 755 P.2d at 1017, 1048, 248 Cal. Rptr.

471

although the prosecutor's argument "contravened the spirit, if not
the letter" of the law, the argument was not prejudicial.127 Ainsworth was tried under the 1977 statute, and the court made the distinction that the jury had much more latitude under the 1977 jury
instructions to opt for a penalty of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. 128 This, coupled with "overwhelming 'other
crimes' evidence,"129 prevented the improper argument from having
a "significant impact" on the jury's decision.130 Thus, "those considerations compel a conclusion that the prosecutor's comments could
13
not have been prejudicial under any applicable standard." 1
While it is improper to argue that the absence of a mitigating factor constitutes an aggravating factor, it is permissible to argue during
the penalty phase that the defendant showed no remorse for his
crime.132 "The concept of remorse for past offenses as a mitigating
factor sometimes warranting less severe punishment or condemnation is universal. The prosecutor's argument here merely demonstrated the absence of that particular mitigating factor."'1 3 The court
found that "the prosecutor should be entitled to observe that a particular mitigating circumstance, such as the defendant's remorse for his
victim, is lacking from the case"'1 4 so long as the prosecutor does not
"argue that the absence of such mitigating factors is itself an aggra568, 597 (1988) (citing People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr.
794 (1985)). See generally 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.0515][a]
(Supp. 1988); Sicola & Shreves, Jury Considerationof MitigatingEvidence: A Renewed
Challenge to the Constitutionalityof Texas' Death Penalty Law, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55
(Fall/Winter 1987-1988); Note, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Texas Death Penalty
Statute, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 69 (Fall/Winter 1987-1988); Note, Magwood v. Smith: The
Effect of a Jury's Failure to Consider Mitigating Circumstances in a Death Penalty
Case, 12 LAW AND PYSCH. REV. 151 (Spring 1988); Note, ProsecutorialMisconduct: The
Limitations Upon the Prosecutor's Role as an Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1119
(law and order appeals to societal and political considerations).
127. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d at 1034, 755 P.2d at 1049, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
128. Id. at 1034, 755 P.2d at 1049, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1035, 755 P.2d at 1049, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
132. See, e.g., People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 82-83, 753 P.2d 1, 34-35, 246 Cal. Rptr.
209, 243 (1988), the prosecutor argued: "You don't see a person drooped over the chair
with tears running down his face, or somebody who's impoverished who never had a
chance in life. He is not there." In People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 123, 753 P.2d 37,
60, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 268 (1988) the prosecutor argued:
And what remorse have we heard about from Mr. Thompson? ... Not one
thing has been said to indicate that that man has a sign of remorse for what
he did.... He sunned himself on the beach. He partied, he drank, he smoked
dope. He went down to Mexico, went diving for lobster.
See also People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d at 807, 808, 755 P.2d at 346-47, 248 Cal. Rptr. at
163.
133. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d at 82, 753 P.2d at 35, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (quoting People v.
Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 771, 739 P.2d 1250, 1271, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 103 (1987).
134. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d at 82, 753 P.2d at 35, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
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vating factor justifying the death penalty."135 Lack of remorse can
also be introduced to "negate evidence in mitigation" introduced by
3

the defense.1 6
Arguing that certain other mitigating factors are not present is a
proper prosecutorial argument, so long as the argument is not that
the absence of a mitigating factor constitutes aggravation.13 7 Further,
even a brief argument suggesting that the absence of a mitigating factor rises to the level of aggravating factor is not viewed as reversible
misconduct.138 The court took into consideration the defense coun-

sel's argument urging the jury to consider certain mitigating factors
in favor of the defendant and held that the jury was not misled. 3 9
H.

Alleged Improper Reference to the Victim's Family
Four of the cases in this survey involved allegations of inappropri-

ate remarks during the penalty phase concerning the impact on the
victim's family.140 Such victim impact statements were barred by
Booth v. Maryland.141 The majority found that Booth was "patently
distinguishable" in that it barred the introduction of formal evidence.142 They held that in each of the four cases the prosecutor's
135. Id. (emphasis in original).
136. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d at 124, 753 P.2d at 60, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 269; People v.
Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 190, 753 P.2d 629, 658, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 702 (1988) (lack of
remorse elicited by the prosecutor on cross-examination of defendant's character
witnesses).
137. The prosecutor argued, "we just can't think of any circumstance which would
extenuate the gravity of this crime." Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d at 83, 753 P.2d at 35, 346 Cal.
Rptr. at 244; cf People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 789-90, 726 P.2d 113, 152, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 667, 706 (1986).
138. In People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 755 P.2d 960, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1988), the
prosecutor made an argument that the court viewed as "a solitary fleeting statement
suggesting that the absence of at least one, and possibly two of the listed factors ...
could be considered as aggravating." Id. at 1119, 755 P.2d at 1013, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
139. "In light of the focus of the penalty phase arguments ...we find no reasonable
possibility that the prosecutor's brief mischaracterization of one or two statutory sentencing factors influenced the jury's sentencing decision." Id. at 1119-20, 755 P.2d at
1013-14, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
140. People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 82-83, 753 P.2d 1, 35, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 243
(1988); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 338-39, 753 P.2d 1082, 1102, 246 Cal. Rptr. 888,
907 (1988); Rich, 45 Cal. 3d at 1089-90, 755 P.2d at 993-94, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45; People v. Siripongs, 45 Cal. 3d 548, 579-80, 754 P.2d 1306, 1324-25, 247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 747-48
(1988).
141. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987); see 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE

§ 87.03[3] (Supp. 1988); Comment, Constitutional Law, Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Eighth Amendment ProhibitsIntroduction of Victim Impact Evidence at Sentencing of Capital.Murder Trial, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1159 (1988); Comment, Another
View, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1175 (1988).
142. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d at 83, 753 P.2d at 35, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 244; Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at

comments were not introductions of formal evidence, but were instead, "brief" comments that did not prejudice the defendant.143
Justice Mosk, in his concurring opinions in People v. Siripongs'44
and People v. Rich 145 would place some limits on the majority's interpretation of Booth. While finding that the majority position of upholding the penalty decision was correct, he would not go so far as to
approve of the prosecutor's argument. 146 He found no basis in Booth
for the majority to distinguish between the "introduction of formal
evidence" and the prosecutor's argument. 147 Citing Justice Powell,
Justice Mosk stated, "the purpose of excluding discussion of the grief
of the families ...is so as not to 'inflame the jury.' It should be obvious that a jury can be inflamed by calculated argument as well as by
witness testimony." 148
L Alleged Improper Comment on the Defendant's Future
Dangerousness
In the cases where alleged improper comment on the defendant's
future dangerousness 49 was raised, the court held that it was not improper for the prosecutor, during the penalty phase closing argument, to raise the possibility of the defendant's potential for future
dangerousness.150 The defendants relied on People v. Murtishaw,151
339, 753 P.2d at 1102, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 907; Siripongs, 45 Cal. 2d at 580, 754 P.2d at
1324-25,'248 Cal. Rptr. at 748 (quoting People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 112-13, 744 P.2d
1127, 1162, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 629 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2026 (1988).
143. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d at 83, 753 P.2d at 35, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 244; Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at
339, 753 P.2d at 1102, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 907; Rich, 45 Cal. 3d at 1090, 755 P.2d at 994, 248
Cal. Rptr. at 544; Siripongs, 45 Cal. 3d at 580, 754 P.2d at 1325, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 748; see
People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987); Miranda, 44
Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594.
144. 45 Cal. 3d at 586, 754 P.2d at 1329, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
145. 45 Cal. 3d at 1124, 755 P.2d at 1017, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 567-68.
146. Siripongs, 45 Cal. 3d at 586, 754 P.2d at 1329, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
147. Id. at 587, 754 P.2d at 1329, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53.
148. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d at 1124-25, 755 P.2d at 1017, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 568 (citing Maryland v. Booth, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987)). See People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 500, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 276 (1984).
149. See generally 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE §§ 87.03[3], 87.05(5]
(Supp. 1988); Stier, Privilege,Empiricism in Legal Dialogue: Death and Dangerousness, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271 (1988).
150. People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 81, 753 P.2d 1, 34, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 242 (1988);
People v. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 197-98, 753 P.2d 629, 663, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 707
(1988); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 337, 753 P.2d 1082, 1101, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 905
(1988); Rich, 45 Cal. 3d at 1123, 755 P.2d at 1016, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67; People v.
Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 639, 754 P.2d 1070, 1089-90, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 593 (1988); People v.
Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 124-25, 753 P.2d 37, 60-61, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 269 (1988).
151. 29 Cal. 3d 733, 773, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, (1981). See Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d
at 81, 753 P.3d at 34, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 242; Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d at 198, 753 P.2d at 663,
246 Cal. Rptr. at 707; Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at 337, 753 P.2d at 1101, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 905;
Silva, 45 Cal. 3d at 639, 754 P.2d at 1090, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 593; Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d at
125, 753 P.2d at 60-61, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 269.

[Vol. 16: 431, 1989]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

where the court held that "[i]n view of the unreliability of that forecast... the probative value of that testimony is far outweighed by its
prejudicial impact." 5 2 The court, however, pointed out that their
ruling in Murtishaw had concerned the introduction of expert testimony of dangerousness. 53 The court held that a prosecutor's argument did not present the same kind of potential for unfair impact on
the jury.154 In addition, the prosecutor's comments can be justified if
55
made in rebuttal to the "defendant's own evidence and argument."1
Finally, the court held that references to future dangerousness
were not limited to "actual violence while in custody."156 So long as
the argument was based on evidence that had been properly admitted, the comment was permissible. 157 The argument was held to be
proper and nothing more than "vigorous argument."'158
J.

Alleged Improper Comment on the Defendant'sFailure to
Testify

In this survey, there were four allegations of improper comment by
the prosecutor on the defendant's testimony or choice not to testify
152. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d at 81, 753 P.2d at 34, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (quoting People v.
Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 773, 631 P.2d 446, 470, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 762 (1981), cert
denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1981)).
153. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d at 81, 753 P.2d at 34, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 243; Heishman, 45 Cal.
3d at 198, 753 P.2d at 663, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 707; Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at 337, 753 P.2d at
1101, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 906; Silva, 45 Cal. 3d at 639, 754 P.2d at 1089-90, 247 Cal. Rptr. at
593; Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d at 125, 753 P.2d at 61, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
154. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d at 81, 753 P.2d at 34, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (citing People v.
Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1987)); Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d
at 125, 753 P.2d at 61, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 269-70. Justice Arguelles would also allow expert testimony if it did not include a firm prediction of future dangerousness. 45 Cal.
3d at 125, 753 P.2d at 61, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 269 (citing Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d at 767, 631
P.2d at 466, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 758). Further, the court stated that it found "no constitutional impediment to consideration of such testimony, whether expert or lay." Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d at 125, 753 P.2d at 61, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 269 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 896-906 (1983)). But see Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at 337, 753 P.2d at 1097, 246 Cal.
Rptr. at 902; Silva, 45 Cal. 3d at 639, 754 P.2d at 1089-90, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 593; Gillers,
The Quality of Mercy: ConstitutionalAccuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1037, 1101-07 (1985).
155. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d at 639, 754 P.2d at 1090, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 593 (citing People v.
Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 776, 700 P.2d 782, 792, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11 (1985) (the court held
similar evidence used in rebuttal was admissible).
156. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d at 1123, 755 P.2d at 1016, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 567
157. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d at 198, 753 P.2d at 663, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 707; Rich, 45 Cal.
3d at 1123, 755 P.2d at 1016, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 567 (citing People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d
247, 288, 710 P.2d 861, 887-88, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 821 (1985)).
158. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d at 1123, 755 P.2d at 1016, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 567 (citing People v.
Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 580, 659 P.2d 1144, 1148-49, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 859-601
(1983)).

at all.159 All occurred during the guilt phase of the trial. When read
in context, the comments of the prosecutors did not infringe on
either the defendant's right to testify even against the advice of counsel,' 6 0 or on the defendant's right to refuse to testify.161 The cases
also shared the defect of the defendant's failure to object to any curable error. 6 2 A fourth case, People v. Belmontes,16s raised an issue of
possible error under Doyle v. Ohio'64 when the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant on his "post-arrest silence."165 Although the
court found a potential for error, any possible error was cured by the
defense counsel's objection and subsequent admonition by the
judge.166 Also, any error was held "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."167
K. Failureto Present MitigatingEvidence
Two cases involved the defense counsel's acquiescence in the defendant's wish not to present mitigating evidence. 168 In each case,
69
the defendant claimed reversal was required under People v. Deere1
159. People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 785-87, 755 P.2d 310, 332-33, 248 Cal. Rptr.
126, 148-49 (1988); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 946-48, 755 P.2d 917, 935-36, 248
Cal. Rptr. 467, 486 (1988); Rich, 45 Cal. 3d at 1089, 755 P.2d at 993, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 544;
People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 112-13, 753 P.2d 37, 52-53, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 260-62

(1988).
160. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d at 947, 755 P.2d at 935, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 486; Thompson, 45
Cal. 3d at 113-14, 753 P.2d at 52-53, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 260-61.
161. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d at 1089, 755 P.2d at 993, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
162. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d at 967, 755 P.2d at 947-48, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 486; Rich, 45
Cal. 3d at 1089, 755 P.2d at 993, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 544; Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d at 114, 753
P.2d at 53, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
163. 45 Cal. 3d 744, 755 P.2d 310, 248 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1988).
164. 742 U.S. 320 (1985).
165. People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 785, 755 P.2d 370, 331, 248 Cal. Rptr. 126,
148 (1988).
166. Id. at 785, 755 P.2d at 332, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
167. Id. at 787, 755 P.2d at 333, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (citing Greer v. Miller, 107 S.
Ct. 3102 (1987)); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); cf People v. Jackson, 28
Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980). See also notes 1-12 supra and accompanying text.
168. People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 960-61, 755 P.2d 917, 945, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467,
495-96 (1988); People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 1127, 1149-54, 751 P.2d 901, 915-18, 245
Cal. Rptr. 635, 650-53 (1988). See 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE
§§ 87.03[3], 87.05[5][a] (1988).
169. 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1985). See Denton, Recent Developments in CriminalLaw Practices:The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION FOR THE BAR § 5.7, at 78-79 (Feb. 1988) (the court will not
question tactical reasons for not presenting mitigating evidence); Carter, Maintaining
Systematic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-appointedCounsel to Present
Mitigating Evidence When the DefendantAdvocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (Fall
1987); Comment, Mitigating Evidence After Deere, 24 CAL. W.L. REV. 303 (1987-1988)
(analyzing whether a defendant proceeding in propria persona will be required to
present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of a capital case); Comment, People v. Deere: MitigatingEvidence in CapitalSentencing: Defense Opportunityor Obligation?,9 CRIM. JUST. J. 349 (1988) (arguing that a clash between a defendant's right to
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and People v. Burgener.170 Deere and Burgener shared this common
element of defense counsel's acquiescence to the defendant's desire
not to present mitigating evidence. 171 However, in Deere and
Burgener, unlike Guzman and Williams, the defendant also asked
for the death penalty. 172 The court in Deere overturned the decision
for two reasons: first, the withholding of "potentially crucial information" made the decision unreliable;173 and second, the failure to present mitigating evidence denied the defendant his right to effective
assistance of counsel.174 In Burgener, the court overturned the death
penalty on the grounds that a "judgment of death imposed in such
circumstances constitutes a miscarriage of justice."175
In Williams, the court distinguished Deere/Burgener stating
"Burgeneritself suggests, the extent to which such 'error' may result
in an 'unreliable' sentencing decision depends largely on the instructions and arguments about the scope of the jury's inquiry and discretion." 176 Here, the court held that the prosecutor had done an
"excellent job of explaining" the jury's duty.177 Second, as in
Burgener, "failure to present available mitigating character evidence
may leave the defendant without any mitigating circumstances" 78
and result in "directed verdict of death."179 By telling the jury they
could consider certain "statutory factors" in mitigation, the prosecutor cured any error in this area. Finally, in both Deere and Burgener,
the defendant had asked for death, unlike the defendant in
8
Williams.1
o
Looking next at the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
conduct their case as they desire and the state's interest in a "reliable verdict" put
counsel in a position of having to decide between an ethical duty to represent the client's wishes and a duty to present mitigating evidence); Note, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461 (1987) (arguing for requiring
counsel to present mitigating evidence).
170. 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P.2d 1251, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1986).
171. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 360-61, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18; Burgener, 41
Cal. 3d at 540-41, 714 P.2d at 1274, 224 Cal Rptr. at 136-37.
172. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 361-63, 710 P.2d at 929-30, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19; Burgener,
41 Cal. 3d at 541, 741 P.2d at 1274-75, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
173. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 364, 710 P.2d at 931, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20).
174. Id. at 364-66, 710 P.2d at 931-32, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
175. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 542, 714 P.2d at 1275, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (quoting
Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 368, 710 P.2d at 934, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23).
176. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 1152, 751 P.2d at 917, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.

court again distinguished Deere and Burgener. 181 The court noted
that neither decision discussed the general rule that prejudice must
be proved before a judgment can be reversed for the type of alleged
'unreasonable' attorney conduct involved here. 182 The court stated,
"[w]e cannot, and will not, predicate reversal of a judgment on mere
speculation that some undisclosed testimony may have altered the
result."183
In holding that no Deere/Burgener error had occurred in Guzman,
the court did not reach as far as it did in Williams.I84 The court
found that although the defense counsel had acquiesced in defendant's desire not to present third-party testimony, the defendant had
presented mitigating evidence in his own testimony at the penalty
85
phase.
In dissenting to the affirmance of the death penalty in Williams,
Justice Mosk found that no error was harmless.186 The fact that the
defendant did not ask for the death penalty should not have been the
determining factor; rather, the "complete absence of evidence in mitigation" is the deciding factor.1 8 7 Holding otherwise goes against the
principle of Lockett v. Ohio188 that "the sentencer must be permitted
to consider any aspect of the defendant's character and record as an
independently mitigating factor."' 18 9 "[T]he fact that the verdict of
death in each of those cases [Deere and Burgener] may have been
more unreliable than the verdict here is immaterial: the verdict of
death in this case remains constitutionally unreliable."'190
L. Cumulative Error
In People v. Lucky, 191 the court identified three errors that nonetheless were found to be harmless. 192 The defendant charged that
181.

Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 1153, 751 P.2d at 918, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 652.

182. Id
183. Id. at 1154, 751 P.2d at 918, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53.
184. People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 960-61, 755 P.2d 917, 945, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467,
495-96 (1988).
185. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d at 961, 755 P.2d at 945, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
186. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 1160, 751 P.2d at 922, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 657 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
187. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 1161, 751 P.2d at 923, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 657 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
188. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
189. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 1159, 751 P.2d at 922, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
190. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 1160, 751 P.2d at 923, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 657 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
191. 45 Cal. 3d 259, 753 P.2d 1052, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988).
192. "(1) the prosecutor's 'life sentence' and 'escape' reference, (2) the 'double
charging' of multiple-murder special circumstances, and (3) admission of the Ryder
testimony as to nonstatutory aggravating factors." Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 303, 753 P.2d at
1081, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
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even if no single error was enough for reversal, when added together
the cumulative effect was prejudicial. 193 The court, however, was not
prepared to accept this premise. 194 Given the weight of the evidence,
the nature of the crime, and the jury's proper understanding of its
duty, the court was not "persuaded that the cumulative effect of the
errors identified could have affected the verdict."195
Justice Broussard, concurring in the guilt phase, but dissenting in
the penalty phase, would have allowed for such cumulative effect.
He reasoned there was enough of a possibility that had there been no
error, the verdict would have been different. This was enough to
warrant reversal.196 In his dissent in People v. Silva,197 Justice
Broussard argued for reversal along the same lines. In this case,
there were excessive charges of special circumstances, repeated argument on these special circumstances, and admission into evidence of
the defendant's threat to kill a police officer. Justice Broussard
found that these errors were not harmless and that the "combined effect ... was to tip the jury's decision in favor of death."'98
Although prior California Supreme Court decisions'99 and decisions in other jurisdictions recognized that the cumulation of minor
errors could prejudice the jury's decision,20 0 Justice Broussard was
193. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 303, 753 P.2d at 1081, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 29; see generally, B.
Reversible Error § 756 (1963 & Supp.
1985); B. WITIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 359 (3d ed. 1985); 5 AM. JUR. 2D
Appeal and Error § 789 (1962 & Supp. 1988).
194. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 303, 753 P.2d at 1081, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
195. Id. at 304, 753 P.2d at 1086, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
196. Id. at 304-05, 753 P.2d at 1081-82, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
197. 45 Cal. 3d 604, 643, 745 P.2d 1070, 1092, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 596 (1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
198. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d at 648, 754 P.2d at 1096, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 599 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
199. People v. Lucky, 41 Cal. 3d 315, 710 P.2d 959, 221 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1985) (opinion
by Broussard, J.) (each error had a small but real possibility of affecting the jury's verdict); People v. Holt, 37 Cal. 3d 436, 690 P.2d 1207, 208 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1984) (in the
absence of cumulative errors, there is more likely a favorable result to the defendant);
People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 383 P.2d 412, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963) (cumulative effects of errors misled the jury); People v. Terry, 57 Cal. 2d 538, 370 P.2d 985, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 185 (1962) (cumulative effect of errors denied defendant a fair trial); People v.
Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953) (cumulative effect required reversal).
200. Harris v. Housewright, 697 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982) (no single error sufficient,
but cumulative effect was ineffective assistance of counsel); United States ex rel. Lewis
v. Lane, 656 F. Supp. 181 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (cumulative effect of defense counsel errors
violated sixth amendment rights). "In some instances a single error may result in a
determination that counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance. In other
instances the cumulative effect of a combination of errors may cause a finding of ineffective assistance." Project Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

alone in supporting this position in Lucky. It appears that an error,
standing alone, must be prejudicial to require reversal. The cumulative effect of otherwise harmless errors, in light of the entire record,
is not sufficient to warrant overturning the verdict.201
M.

Jailhouse Informant

Jailhouse informant testimony202 is admissible at the penalty phase
and does not require sua sponte instructions to view the testimony
with distrust.20 3 There is also no sixth amendment violation if the
informant acts as a "mere listening post."204 Further, the defendant
has the burden to establish that there was governmental action "beyond their merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit
2
incriminating remarks." 05
Justice Mosk, dissenting from the affirmance of the death penalty
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1984-1985, II Trial, 74 GEO. L.J. 751, 762
(1986) (footnotes omitted); see also Annotation, PostretirementOut-Of-Court Communications Between Jurors and Trial Judge as Grounds For New Trial or Reversal in
Criminal Case, 43 A.L.R. 4TH 410, § 2(b) (1986) (the error plus any other error may
have a cumulative effect); Annotation, Proprietyand PrejudicialEffect of Prosecutor's
Argument to Jury Indicating That He Has Additional Evidence of Defendant's Guilt
Which He Did Not Deem Necessary to Present, 90 A.L.R. 3D 646, § 8 (1979 & Supp.
1988) (cumulative effect of prosecutor's remarks); Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Prosecutor'sArgument Giving Jury Impression that Defense Counsel Believes Accused Guilty, 89 A.L.R. 3D 263, § 8 (1979) (cumulative effect of leading to
improper Briggs-type speculation).
201. Lucky, 44 Cal. 3d at 303-04, 753 P.2d at 1081, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 647; see 5 AM.
JUR. 2D Appeal and Error § 789 (1962 & Supp. 1988) ("At least one court has rejected
the rule as to cumulative minor error, holding that each claim of error must stand or
fall on its own merits.").
202. At the time this survey was prepared, due to an informant's report on the ease
with which jailhouse informants can fabricate so-called confessions, the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department was conducting an investigation into the validity of all
such information over the last 10 years. L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1988 at 1, col. 5.
203. People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 118-19, 753 P.2d 37, 56-57, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245,
264-65 (1988) (citing People v. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d 543, 565-66, 749 P.2d 776, 787-88, 244
Cal. Rptr. 121, 133 (1988)).
204. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 1141, 751 P.2d at 909-10, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
205. Id.; see Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); People v. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d 543,
749 P.2d 776, 244 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1988) (cellmate not instructed to inform police); People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1988) (cellmate voluntarily contacted police and then was asked to listen); 2 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE
PRACTICE, Confession and Identification, § 830.26(1) (Supp. 1988) ("defendant must
demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed to elicit incriminating remarks."). But see White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innes and U.S. v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV.
1209, 1250 n.238 (1980) (suggestion of Justice Stevens made during oral argument in
Henry: "If the government is to be prevented from improperly tilting the adversary
balance to its own advantage, it should not matter whether the conduct which causes.
the improper tilt is active or passive."); Note, Sixth Amendment-Right to Counsel:
Limited Post Indictment Use of Jailhouse Informants is Permissible,Kuhlman v. Wilson, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 743, 766 (1986) ("[g]iven an appropriate incentive a
jailhouse informant, even one that does not participate in explicit interrogation, can
act as an equally effective 'nudge' ").
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in People v. Thompson,206 found difficulty with admitting uncorrobo207
rated evidence of solicitation for murder at the penalty phase.
Although the evidence was presented during the guilt phase, it was
also referred to at the penalty phase by the prosecutor in his closing
argument. 208 The alleged solicitation was evidence that was not
properly admitted because it was an "entirely separate offense."209
The prosecutor admitted it was error, but the majority concluded it
was harmless error. 210 Justice Mosk contended that the majority's
characterization of the prosecutor's evidence as rebuttal was incorrect since the evidence was introduced at the guilt phase and the
prosecutor presented no evidence during the penalty phase.2 11 "Thus
it would be fatuous to now claim that the tales of potential killings
were merely rebuttal to good-character evidence offered by defendant in the penalty phase." 212 The majority of the court, however,
gave greater latitude to prosecutorial argument.
N.

Allocution

Allocution is the "formality of [the] court's inquiry of [a] prisoner
as to whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment should
not be pronounced against him on verdict of conviction." 213 In People
v. Robbins,214 the California Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
denial of the defense counsel's request during the penalty phase that
the defendant address the jury personally without having to take the
stand and undergo cross-examination. 215 The court acknowledged
206. 45 Cal. 3d 86, 144, 753 P.2d 37, 74, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 282 (1988) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
207. Id. at 144, 753 P.2d at 74, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE,

Immunity for Testimony § 25.17

(1986 & Supp. 1988) (instructions requested by the defense as to the credibility of informants); see generally 30 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1151 (1967); 24A C.J.S.Criminal
Law § 1883 (1962 & Supp. 1988) (proper appellate review of lower court's judgment
concerning credibility of witnesses).
208. 45 Cal. 3d at 145, 753 P.2d at 75, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 283 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 144-45, 753 P.2d at 74, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 283 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 144-45, 753 P.2d at 74-75, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 282-83 (Mosk,,J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 145, 753 P.2d at 75, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 283 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
213. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (5th ed. 1979). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 607 (1963 and Supp. 1985); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal
Law §§ 531-32 (1981 & Supp. 1988); 96 A.L.R. 2D 1292 (1964); Note, ProceduralDue
Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARv. L. REV. 821, 832-33 (1968); Com-

ment, Lights, Camera, Allocution: Contemporary Relevance or Director'sDream?, 62
TUL. L. REV. 207 (1987).
214. 45 Cal. 3d 867, 755 P.2d 355, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1988).
215. Id. at 888-90, 755 P.2d at 368-69, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 184-86.

that no United States Supreme Court case was on point. However,
the court cited a Fourth Circuit opinion 216 for the proposition that in
a non-capital case, "when a defendant effectively communicates his
desire to the trial judge to speak to the imposition of sentence, it is a
denial of due process not to grant the defendant's request."2 17 The
court distinguished this decision, because "[t]he sentencing phase of a
capital trial .... specifically provides for such testimony.... Given
this, we fail to see the need, much less a constitutional requirement,
for a corresponding 'right to address the sentencer without being subject to cross-examination' in capital cases." 2 18 The court also distinguished a Maryland opinion 2 19 which upheld the defendant's
common law right to address the jury without subjecting himself to
cross-examination. 220 Common law does not recognize such a
right.221

Justice Mosk concurred in the opinion, but wrote separately to emphasize his view of the right to allocution in a capital case. Citing the
United States Supreme Court222 and numerous other state opinions, 223 he queried whether "the defendant [should] be allowed to

personally address the jury before it reflects on the appropriate penalty."224 Justice Mosk concluded that no error occurred in denying
the defendant this opportunity, because the current state of the law
did not demand it.225 He indicated that this was an "appropriate sub216. Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.) cert denied, 441 U.S. 966
(1978).
217. Ashe, 586 F.2d at 336.
218. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d at 889, 755 P.2d at 369, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
219. Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120 (1986).
220. Id. at 352-59, 509 A.2d at 124-27.
221. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d at 890, 755 P.2d at 369, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 186. The court also
distinguished Harris on the basis that the defendant there made an offer of proof concerning the substance of his requested address to the jury, whereas in Robbins there
was no such offer. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d at 890, 755 P.2d at 369, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86
(citing Harris,306 Md. at 359, 509 A.2d at 127).
222. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961). Justice Frankfurter wrote of "the
need for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court his
plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself." Id. at 304.
223. This right was upheld in Mohn v. State, 584 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1978); Sellman v.
State, 47 Md. App. 510, 423 A.2d 974 (1981); Tomlinson v. State, 98 N.M. 213, 647 P.2d
415 (1982); and State v. Nicoletti, 471 A.2d 613 (R.I. 1984). It was held discretionary in
Patterson v. State, 21 Ala. App. 357, 208 So. 265 (1926); Wilson v. State, 76 Ga. App. 257,
45 S.E.2d 709 (1947); State v. Townley, 149 Minn. 5, 182 N.W. 773 (1921); and State v.
Burkhart, 541 S.2d 365 (Tenn. 1976).
224. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d at 891, 755 P.2d at 370, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
225. Id. at 893, 755 P.2d at 371, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Mosk, J., concurring). See Peter & Pincer, Mercy and the Death Penalty: The Last Plea, 10 CRIM.JUST. J. 41 (1987);
Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a PersonalPleafor Mercy: Common
Law Allocation and ConstitutionalMitigation, 15 N.M. L. REV. 41 (1985) (analysis of
allocution as it applies to New Mexico).
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ject for the Legislature to consider in the future." 22 6 He also noted
that a case was pending before the California Supreme Court where
the defendant, in the trial judge's discretion, was allowed to make a
personal plea to the jury, even though counsel represented him. 22 7
0.

Additional Dissents

In People v. Poggi,228 Justice Mosk dissented as to the penalty
phase decision because he felt "compelled to conclude that the sentence of death is disproportionate to the defendant's 'personal responsibility and moral guilt.' "229 Here, the defendant had introduced
evidence of sufficient mental deficiency 23 0 such that Justice Mosk
thought "his personal moral culpability is not sufficiently grave as to
allow the state to inflict on him the ultimate sanction."231
Justice Mosk also dissented in People v. Heishman 232 because he
believed it was error for the trial judge not to "state his reasons for

denying defendant's automatic application for modification of the
verdict of death under Penal Code section 190.4 subsection(c)." 233 He
noted that the court had previously found this type of the failure to
be prejudicial error.234 Further, Mosk argued that the majority's reliance on People v. Czi Ko Wong2 35 for finding harmless error was
226. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d at 893, 755 P.2d at 371, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
227. Id. (citing People v. Moore, Crim. No. 23721).
228. 45 Cal. 3d 306, 349, 753 P.2d 1082, 1109, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 913 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
229. Id. at 349, 753 P.2d at 1109, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing
Edwards v. Floyd, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
230. "But Dr. Stalberg also testified-without contradiction-that Mr. Poggi had
the judgment and control of a 12 year old." Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d at 349, 753 P.2d at 1109,
246 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
232. 45 Cal. 3d 147, 205, 753 P.2d 629, 668, 246 P.2d 673, 712 (1988) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
233. Id. at 205, 753 P.2d at 668, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 712 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Penal
Code section 190.4(c) provides in pertinent part that: "The court shall state facts in
support of the finding of good cause upon the record and cause them to be entered into
the minutes." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(c) (West 1988). Further, section 190.4(e) provides that "[i]n ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider,
take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating factors . .. [and]
[t]he judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings." Id. § 190.4(e).
234. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d at 205, 753 P.2d at 668, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 712 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (citing People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667
(1986)).
235. 18 Cal. 3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 135 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1976) (involving a juvenile defendant and Juvenile Court law).

misplaced because the issue was not decided. 236 He also concluded
that the court cannot "cure" an error by making modification determinations on its own. 237 Since the trial judge had died, Justice Mosk
concluded the court must either remand for a new penalty phase or
grant a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. 238
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the error asserted at the guilt and special circumstances
phase of the trial, the California Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the trial decision of guilt and at least one special circumstance. The
court undertook a full analysis of the numerous errors alleged by the
various defendants, but the court did not find that there was any procedural or constitutional unfairness at trial in any case.
In the penalty phase, errors in instructions alleged in connection
with factor (k), Brown, and Ramos should no longer occur because
the CALJIC pattern jury instructions now incorporate the previous
decisions of the California Supreme Court. While these issues will
continue to confront the court on appeal, present defendants will
likely have the benefit of proper instructions.
The Lucas court has granted prosecutors wide latitude in the penalty phase for aggressive argument, and the cases reviewed in this
survey overturned a death penalty only when the prosecutor's argument emphasized the instructional ambiguity in Brown and Ramos.
In all instances, the court looked to the totality of the trial, including
other instruction and argument by defense counsel, to determine if
any possible error was cured. There also existed allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, but the court would not reverse for failure to object if there were any possible tactical reason supporting the
failure to object. The court applied the same reasoning for failure to
present mitigating evidence. In addition, the court in no instance
found that such failure rendered the verdict unreliable. As to jailhouse informant testimony, cumulation of error, and the right to allocution, while not presently warranting reversal, vigorous dissents
leave these areas open to further development.
Overall, in these capital cases, the California Supreme Court seriously reviewed the entire record to determine whether asserted errors rose beyond a harmless nature. Given the egregious nature of
the murders, and the substantial weight of evidence against the defendants in these nineteen cases, the court could view the trial as fair
236. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d at 205, 753 P.2d at 668, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 712 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
237. Id. at 205-06, 753 P.2d at 668, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 206, 753 P.2d at 668-69, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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in its totality while deciding that minor flaws in the trial were
harmless.
HOWARD S. FALLMAN
CHARLES ESKRIDGE, III

V.

EDUCATION
The Education Code confers discretion upon local
professionalcompetence commissions to determine the
appropriatenessof tenured employee dismissals even
when an authorized basisfor dismissalexists: Fontana
Unified School Dist. v. Burman.

In Fontana Unified School Districtv. Burman, 45 Cal. 3d 208, 753
P.2d 689, 246 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1988), the court held that local commissions on professional competence, authorized by section 44944 of the
Education Code, have the discretion to determine whether dismissal
of a permanent tenured employee is warranted even though a statutorily-authorized basis for dismissal exists. See CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 49444 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989); 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools §§ 440-442
(1980 & Supp. 1988). The court failed to find any legislative intent
requiring the commission adhere to a recommended sanction simply
because an authorized basis for that sanction exists. See CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 44932(a) (West 1978 & Supp. 1989); 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools
§§ 436, 437, 442 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
The Fontana School District (the District) voted to discharge Burman, a fourteen-year tenured teacher, for immoral conduct, dishonesty, evident unfitness for service, and persistent violations of district
regulations. Each of these charges was a statutorily-recognized basis
for dismissal under section 44932(a) of the Education Code. See CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 44932(a)(1)-(9) (West 1978 & Supp. 1989). Invoking
section 44939, the District immediately suspended Burman without
pay and notified her of her inevitable dismissal unless she demanded
a hearing. See id. §§ 44939, 44944(a); 2 CAL. JUR. 3D Administrative
Law § 104 (1973 & Supp. 1989); 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools §§ 388, 436,
438, 440 (1980 & Supp. 1989). A commission was convened, finding
Burman guilty only of the dishonesty charge. Although the commission realized this was an authorized basis for dismissal under section
44932(a)(3), Burman's unblemished record dictated leniency. In response to the commission's decision, the District sought a writ of
mandamus compelling the commission to impose the recommended
sanction of dismissal.

At issue on appeal was whether finding a statutorily-authorized basis for dismissal mandated discharge. See Midway School Dist. v.
Griffeath, 29 Cal. 2d 13, 172 P.2d 857 (1946). To resolve this issue, the
court examined both the statutory framework of the pertinent sections of the Education Code and the specific language of section
49444(c). See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49444(c) (West 1978 & Supp. 1989).
First, the court pointed out the various options available to a district wanting to pursue a disciplinary action against a tenured employee. The court noted that in virtually all cases, a district has a
choice whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings. See id. § 44934.
Moreover, if the district decides to initiate proceedings, it must then
decide whether to seek suspension or dismissal. See CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 44933(a) (West Supp. 1989). The court illustrated that a district could severely limit the commission's discretion by opting for
certain courses of action over others. When a district foregoes suspension and seeks only dismissal of a teacher under section 44932(a),
the commission may elect to dismiss or not. Here, the commission's
decision not to dismiss was upheld by the trial court. The court of
appeal reversed, holding that if a statutorily-authorized basis for dismissal exists, then section 44944 mandated discharge.
To resolve the interpretation of section 44944, the supreme court
examined the statutory construction. First, the court determined
that while section 44932 provides a teacher cannot be dismissed absent certain grounds, a teacher need not be dismissed if one of these
grounds is discovered. Further, section 44944 allows the commission
to decide whether a teacher should be dismissed, but does not force
the commission to dismiss under any circumstances. See CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 44944(c) (West 1978 & Supp. 1989). Accordingly, the commission must be persuaded that the sanction is appropriate before it is
imposed.
The court next reasoned that when the legislature amends a statute and fails to change previous judicially-construed portions, the legislature presumably concurs with such interpretation. With respect
to immoral or unprofessional conduct, a statutorily-authorized basis
for dismissal, the court had previously held that teacher misconduct
should be measured against a seven-prong standard before dismissal
is warranted. See Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461
P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969); 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools §§ 436-437
(1980 & Supp. 1988). The court presumed that the legislature
adopted this standard since the language of section 44932(a)(1) survived two sets of Education Code amendments. In the present case,
the court declared that this seven-prong standard was to be applied
to dishonesty as well, thus expanding the scope of the commission's
discretion to determine the appropriateness of dismissals.
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Finally, the court relied on two parts of section 44944(c) to conclude that a commission is empowered to determine the appropriateness of dismissals. First, the court noted that a commission is
required to produce a written decision containing findings of fact and
conclusions of issues. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44944(c) (West 1978 &
Supp. 1989). The court concluded that this statutory requirement
forced the commission to ponder the appropriateness of the sanction,
not just resolve whether a statutory basis for dismissal existed.
Additionally, the court compared the procedures involved in dismissing a nontenured and a tenured teacher. The court indicated
that the section 44944 language bestowed more discretion on the commission than did the language of section 44948.3(a)-(b) which pertains
to dismissal procedures of a nontenured teacher, thus injecting more
finality into its decisions. Under section 44948.3, a commission is not
convened when a nontenured teacher is threatened with dismissal.
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44948.3(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1989); 56 CAL. JUR.
3D Schools §§ 445, 447-448 (1980 & Supp. 1988). The court reasoned
that the fact a commission is called when a tenured teacher is subject
to dismissal shows the greater import in proceedings involving such
an employee. Making an illogical leap, the court concluded that because there is greater emphasis placed on dismissal proceedings involving tenured teachers, section 44944 bestows a discretionary role
upon a commission in disciplinary proceedings.
In sum, the court strains to expand the discretionary power of professional competence commissions. By applying tenuous reasoning,
the court legitimizes the seven-prong test set forth in Morrison
whenever a statutorily-authorized basis for dismissal exists. See Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1969). By stretching to reach this decision, the court has shown
its approval of an alternative decision-making process.
JOHN AUGUSTINE SOPUCH III
VI.

ELECTION LAW
A citizen who moves to a temporary residence with no
intent to return to the former domicile andfails to
secure a new domicile may vote in the former domicile's
precinct: Walters v. Weed.

In Walters v. Weed, 45 Cal. 3d 1, .752 P.2d 443, 246 Cal. Rptr. 5
(1988), the supreme court, harmonizing conflicting statutes, held that

a former domicile is not lost until a new one is secured; persons may,
therefore, vote in their former domicile if they temporarily reside
elsewhere. Thus, the court confirmed the election of Jane Weed to
the Santa Cruz City Council by finding that only 113 university students voted illegally when 182 illegal votes were needed to upset
election results.
The contested voters, 472 University of California at Santa Cruz
students, lived on campus and were registered to vote there. In the
fall of 1983, 193 of these students had moved off-campus. Of these,
113 found suitable housing where they intended to stay and eighty
lived in temporary housing, e.g., tents, vans, and friends' houses.
Those who found suitable housing and intended to stay off-campus
were deemed by the trial, appellate, and supreme courts to have established a new domicile, and were in violation of the Elections Code
when they voted in their former on-campus precinct. See Jolicoeurv.
Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 578, 488 P.2d 1, 9, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705 (1971)
("The registrar ...has the power not to register someone who is not
a resident of the jurisdiction."); see also 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw § 118 (8th ed. 1974) (analyzing
Jolicoeur); see generally 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Domicile § 1 (1987). The
supreme court, affirming the trial court, additionally held that the
eighty students who did not acquire a new domicile before voter registration had closed were not in violation of the Elections Code
when they voted in their former on-campus precinct.
The trial court's holding, that the transitory student votes were not
illegal, was premised on section 244 of the Government Code: "A residence cannot be lost until another is gained." CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 244(c) (West 1980); see Fenton v. Board of Directors, 156 Cal. App.
3d 1107, 1113-14, 203 Cal. Rptr. 388, 393 (1984) (interpreting the word
"residence" in the Government Code to mean "domicile"). See also 6
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent & Child §§ 4-6
(8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicile § 16 (1966); 12
CAL. JUR. 3D Conflict of Laws § 28 (1974).
The appellate court, however, believed that the students who
moved off-campus forfeited their right to vote in the on-campus precinct "regardless of whether they had established new domiciles."
Walters, 45 Cal. 3d at 6, 752 P.2d at 445, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 7. This
holding was premised solely on section 200 of the Elections Code
which states that a domicile is a place of fixed habitation "wherein
the person has the intention of remaining ... [and] returning." CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 200(b) (West 1977); see also 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent & Child §§ 4-6 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984);
25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections §§ 66-69 (1966); 12 CAL. JUR. 3D Conflict of
Laws § 25 (1974).
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Thus, an ambiguity exists between the Elections Code and the Government Code: under the former, one's domicile is lost when there
no longer exists the intent to remain or return; under the latter code,
a domicile can never be lost until a new one is secured. To harmonize these statutes, the supreme court reminded the court of appeal
that sections 200-217 of the Elections Code were enacted as a response to fraudulent voting practices where persons already having
new domiciles continue to vote in their former domicile's precinct.
Thus, the court concluded that the Elections Code did not address
the current issue of persons who had not yet secured a new domicile.
After establishing that one's domicile cannot be lost until another
one is acquired, the court addressed the following issue: where should
those residing temporarily vote? See Annotation, Residence of Students For Voting Purposes, 44 A.L.R. 3D 797 (1972). Three precinct
options were presented: the future domicile, the temporary residence,
and the old domicile. Due to an identification problem, the first option was not considered realistic. The second option was rejected because the court feared it would encourage "precinct shoppers."
Although not flawless, the court selected the last option, the old
domicile, reasoning that it is the only abode which satisfies section
200 of the Elections Code-even if only in the past.
Additionally, because the first two options do not satisfy the definitional requirement of "domicile," disenfranchisement would occur
which is against the policy of the Elections Code. Otsuka v. Hite, 64
Cal. 2d 596, 604, 414 P.2d 412, 417, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 289 (1966) (election laws should not be construed to disenfranchise a voter if any
other interpretation of the law is reasonable); see also 28 CAL. JUR.
3D Elections §§ 35 at n.33, 41-42 (1986).
Because a new domicile can only be acquired when one moves with
the subjective intent of remaining, individuals will not be effectively
deterred from falsely asserting that their current residence is not
their domicile and returning to their former domicile to vote. See
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 244(f) (West 1980); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 69
(1966). The result is that persons no longer living in a certain community may continue to affect its politics. See 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 118(2) (8th ed. 1974). It
seems unlikely that this loophole will prompt "carpetbaggers" into
moving for the sake of occasional elections. However, as recognized
by the dissent, the loophole is attractive to those who may move for
legitimate reasons but still wish to maintain a voice in the abandoned
domicile's politics. Nevertheless, the supreme court's decision will

keep fraudulent voting to a minimum while simultaneously reconciling the conflicting statutory mandates.
MICHELLE

VII.

R.

ANDERSON

EVIDENCE
A. Absent a witness's invocation of the privilege against
self-incrimination to make himself "unavailable,"a
prosecutor may comment on defendant's failure to
present the witness's corroboratingtestimony: People v.
Ford.

In People v. Ford, 45 Cal. 3d 431, 754 P.2d 168, 247 Cal. Rptr. 121
(1988), the court held that the mere fact a witness may invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination is insufficient to render the witness "unavailable"; it is necessary to actually call the witness and
have him invoke his privilege. Without such an exercise, the prosecutor may comment on the defendant's failure to call such witnesses
who might corroborate defendant's story. The court noted that comment is particularly appropriate when the defendant's alibi testimony
is likely perjured. See, e.g., United States v. Ariza-Tbarra, 651 F.2d 2
(1st Cir. 1981); State v. Moore, 620 S.W. 2d 370 (Mo. 1981).
Ford and three others were charged with burglary. Two of Ford's
accomplices pleaded guilty prior to his trial, but had not yet been sentenced. At his own trial, Ford denied any participation in the crime,
testifying that he was elsewhere with two of the accomplices at the
time of the burglary. However, Ford failed to call those accomplices
as witnesses to corroborate his testimony. The prosecutor commented to the jury on Ford's failure to call his accomplices, which
the trial court subsequently deemed prejudicial misconduct and
granted Ford's motion for a new trial.
Ford contended that the accomplices were "unavailable" to testify,
predicting that they would exercise their privilege against self-incrimination once they were called to the stand. See U.S. CONST.
amend V. As soon as this privilege was asserted, prosecutorial comment would then be prohibited under the fourteenth amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see CAL. EVID. CODE § 913(a) (West 1966)
[section 913]; see also Griffin v. California,380 U.S. 609 (1965); People v. Wilkes, 44 Cal. 2d 679, 284 P.2d 481 (1955); People v. Klor, 32
Cal. 2d 658, 197 P.2d 705 (1948).
The court, however, stated that four conditions must be satisfied
before the privilege against self-incrimination becomes effective. The
holder of the privilege must first be called to testify, and then sworn
in by the court. The privilege must actually be asserted by the
holder. The court must then determine whether the exercise of the
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privilege is justified under the circumstances. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V; CAL. EVID. CODE § 404 (West 1966); see also People v.
Cornejo, 92 Cal. App. 3d 637, 155 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1979); People v. Harris, 93 Cal. App. 3d 103, 155 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1979). Finally, no stipulation may exist between the parties that the holder will exercise the
privilege if called to testify. If these requirements are met, or if the
witness cannot be located, the witness is then deemed "unavailable"
to testify. See People v. Frohner,65 Cal. App. 3d 94, 135 Cal. Rptr.
153 (1976).
The court held that none of these requirements were met here.
The accomplices, as holders of the privilege, were never called by the
defendant to testify, and thus never asserted their privilege against
self-incrimination. Furthermore, the defendant could not invoke the
privilege on behalf of the accomplices. See People v. Lewis, 222 Cal.
App. 2d 136, 35 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963). The court added that witnesses do
not become "unavailable" simply because they might exercise the
privilege if called to testify. The two accomplices were therefore
"available" to testify regarding the veracity of the defendant's alibi.
The court then found that comment on a defendant's failure to call
an "available" and necessary witness was permissible. In support of
this conclusion, the court reasoned that the defendant's failure to call
collateral witnesses was itself relevant evidence. Such exclusion constitutes an admission that the testimony could not be corroborated.
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 272 (2d ed. 1984); 2 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 285 (Chadbourd ed. 1979). Since the California Constitution
favors the admissibility of relevant evidence, the court concluded
such comment was permissible. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). In
addition, the court noted that neither case law nor section 913 precluded the admissibility of prosecutorial comment. Cf.People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986)
(comment by the court is permissible).
The court added, however, that the judge has the discretion to determine when the circumstances are such that comment is not permissible. This determination should be made out of the presence of
the jury. The court recommended that the prosecutor first disclose
to the judge and opposing counsel the nature of the comment. This
allows the defendant an opportunity either to call those witnesses, or
to convince the judge of their "unavailability." The judge may then
determine whether comment to the jury is permissible under the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. C7awans, 38 N.J. 162, 183 A.2d 77
(1962).

The court's rationale for permitting prosecutorial comment is to
prevent perjured testimony. The court reasoned that permitting such

comment imposes a burden upon defendants to corroborate their testimony. Absent extenuating circumstances, failure to do so will result in an inference that the testimony is false.
Thus, the court's conclusion that prosecutorial comment is both admissible and relevant evidence is an important step in combating perjury. The court places a burden upon the defendant to corroborate a
weak alibi with an "available" witness. Should the defendant elect
not to do so, the prosecutor may now portray an apparently solid alibi
as sorely lacking truth and substance.
BRYAN HANCE

B. A jury instruction which outlines specific factors in
evidence casting reasonable doubt on eyewitness
testimony is permissible when the factors are described in
a neutral, nonexplanatory manner: People v. Wright.
In People v. Wright, 45 Cal. 3d 1126, 755 P.2d 1049, 248 Cal. Rptr.
600 (1988), the court determined that the trial court properly refused
to read to the jury defendant's special instructions regarding the veracity of eyewitness testimony. However, the trial court erred in refusing to read a specific instruction explaining how the jury should
analyze each eyewitness's testimony. Nevertheless, the court found
this error to be harmless.
During an armed robbery of a wholesale beverage warehouse,
three of the eleven employees accosted by the robbers were able to
personally identify the defendant, even though he wore a black
stocking mask. One witness identified the defendant at trial; another
witness positively identified the defendant at a lineup; and the final
eyewitness chose the defendant's picture from a photo-spread but
could not conclusively identify the defendant at the trial. Based
solely on these eyewitnesses' accounts of the crime, the defendant
was convicted. Wright, 45 Cal. 3d at 1132, 755 P.2d at 1051, 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 602.
The defendant's sole contention on appeal was that the trial court
erred in not allowing five specially drafted jury instructions to be
read to the jury. The defendant's first and fourth jury instructions
would have required the trial court to notify the jury that "the prosecutor has the burden of proof on the issue of identity," and that the
defendant "need not prove his innocence or another's guilt." Id. at
1134, 755 P.2d at 1052-53, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
The court easily dispensed with the defendant's argument that the
trial court erred in not allowing these instructions to be read to the
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jury. By reading California Jury Instruction (Criminal) (CALJIC)
No. 2.91 to the jury, any further instruction which touched on the
same matters would merely be duplicative and unnecessary. The
court reasoned that any repetitive or duplicative instructions
presented to a trial court as special instructions need not be read
when the trial court has already read a generalized form instruction
on the same topic. Id. at 1134, 755 P.2d at 1053, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 60304. See People v. Martinez, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1372, 1378-79, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 219, 223 (1987); People v. McCowan, 85 Cal. App. 3d 675, 679-80,
149 Cal. Rptr. 611, 613-14' (1978) (prohibition of redundant, duplicative jury instructions).
The defendant next argued that the trial court erroneously rejected his second special jury instruction. This instruction required
that "certain specific items of evidence introduced at trial" be listed
in order for jury members to analyze such factors when deciding if
the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, was guilty of the crimes
for which he was indicted. Wright, 45 Cal. 3d at 1135, 755 P.2d at
1053, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
Rejecting this argument, the court found no error in the trial
court's refusal to read the defendant's second special jury instruction.
The court reasoned that such an instruction was argumentative.
Since CALJIC No. 2.91 (which instructs jurors on "the burden of
proof of identification") was read to the jury, any further instruction
on this issue would merely be argumentative. Id. at 1138, 755 P.2d at
1055, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 606. See People v. Castellano, 79 Cal. App. 3d
844, 858, 145 Cal. Rptr. 264, 272 (1978); People v. McNamara, 94 Cal.
509, 513, 29 P. 953, 954 (1892) (prohibition of argumentative jury instructions); see also People v. Gomez, 24 Cal. App. 3d 486, 490, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 898 (1972) (jury instructions can specifically address a defense theory and how to interrelate defense evidence to the prosecution's burden of proof).
The defendant also objected to the trial court's refusal to read his
third special jury instruction which described three different means
of assessing eyewitness identification testimony. The court held that
denying a reading of this instruction was error because California authorities, as well as out-of-state courts allow reading this type of jury
instruction to enable jurors to measure eyewitnesses' perception of
an event against the prosecution's burden of proof. Although acknowledging trial court error in not reading this instruction, the
court emphasized that future instructions of this type must only "focus the jury's attention on the existence of reasonable doubt regard-

ing identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors
supported by the evidence." Wright, 45 Cal. 3d at 1141, 755 P.2d at
1058, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d
552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (original promulgation of this type of jury
instruction); Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Need
for Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1387, 1402-19 (1983) (collection of various state court decisions
regarding this type of jury instruction). See generally 75 AM. JUR. 2D
Trial §§ 854-866 (1974 & Supp. 1988); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw
§§ 3084-3091 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
Despite the court's determination that the refusal to read the defendant's third special jury instruction was error, it nevertheless
found three reasons that the error was not prejudicial. Wright, 45
Cal. 3d at 1144, 755 P.2d at 1060, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 611. First, the evidence established that none of the eleven witnesses doubted that the
defendant was the culprit and that the defendant's alibi could be discounted by the jury; therefore, the evidence was so overwhelmingly
in favor of the prosecution's case that any error in refusing to instruct the jury as to the defendant's third instruction was harmless.
Second, the combination of aggressive cross-examination of the three
eyewitnesses, defense counsel's closing arguments, and the jury instructions given were sufficient for the jury to question the veracity
of the eyewitnesses' accounts of the crime, thus providing a viable
substitute for the elements outlined in the defendant's third jury instruction. Third, there was no evidence of jury confusion given the
"short period of jury deliberation (less than one day) and the lack of
juror requests for clarification." Id. at 1144-52, 755 P.2d at 1060-65,
248 Cal. Rptr. at 611-16.
The defendant's final contention was that his fifth special instruction was improperly withheld from the jury. This instruction "would
advise the jury that eyewitness identification testimony may be mistaken and 'should be received with caution.'" Id. at 1152, 755 P.2d at
1065, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 616. The court reasoned that this instruction
was unnecessary since the factors mentioned as to instruction
number three were adequate to highlight the problems associated
with eyewitness identifications. Furthermore, such an instruction
would give jurors the wrong impression by suggesting that the court
considered this evidence "suspect," and also would subvert the jury's
responsibility as the trier of fact by implying that eyewitness testimony is "often mistaken." Thus, the trial court's refusal to read the
fifth special jury instruction was not error. Id. at 1154, 755 P.2d at
1067, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18. See State v. Watson, 318 S.E.2d 603, 614
(W. Va. 1984) (only other court to address this issue and reject similar jury instruction).

[Vol. 16: 431, 1989]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Wright essentially approves of CALJIC No. 2.91 as applied to cases
where a prosecution is based entirely on uncorroborated eyewitness
testimony. So long as the factors listed in this type of instruction
merely focus on facts relevant to a determination of the existence of
reasonable doubt regarding the eyewitness's identification in a neutral, nonexplanatory manner, then the instruction should be read to
the jury. However, future courts faced with a factual scenario similar
to Wright should not ignore Justice Mosk's insightful dissent which
suggests factors for inclusion in this type of instruction. Furthermore, courts should attempt to explain the effect each individual factor has on analyzing eyewitness identifications since jurors may not
comprehend the appropriate application.
PETER BENNETT LANGBORD

VIII.

SENTENCING & CORRECTION
The Board of Prison Terms' wide discretion to rescind a
prisoner'sparole will be affirmed on appeal when there
is some supportingevidence in the record: In re Powell.

In In re Powell, 45 Cal. 3d 894, 755 P.2d 881, 248 Cal. Rptr. 431
(1988), the court held that the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) did not
abuse its discretion in rescinding a prisoner's parole when there was
"some evidence" in the record to support that decision. The court added that the BPT has wide, though not absolute, discretion in handling parole matters. See Falk, The Supreme Court of California
1971-1972, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 427-28 (1973); Note, The California
Adult Authority, 5 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 360, 368, 376-77 (1972). Such
discretion is limited by the prisoner's right to due process; the decision must have a factual basis and not be merely a response to public
outrage.
Gregory Powell was convicted in 1967 of first degree murder and
sentenced to death for slaying a police officer. See People v. Powell,
40 Cal. App. 3d 107, 115 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1974). By 1972, the BPT determined that Powell's behavior had improved and granted him a parole release date. Public outrage was renewed, however, following
the 1980 national telecast of the film, The Onion Field, which recounted Powell's story. Several doctors subsequently examined Powell after state and local officials expressed concern to the BPT over
Powell's upcoming parole. The BPT's decision was based in part
upon a report by a Dr. Sutton (the Sutton Report) who examined

Powell's record, including a 1978 letter from a prison guard regarding
two alleged incidents of sexual misconduct. The Sutton Report concluded that Powell remained a potential threat to society. Powell
then sought and received a writ of habeas corpus.
The court first defined the scope of the BPT's jurisdiction concerning parole matters. The BPT may determine the date of a prisoner's
parole or release. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 5075-5082 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1989). In addition, the BPT may revoke a prisoner's parole
upon a showing of cause. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3041.5, 3041.7
(West 1982 & Supp. 1989); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 2450 (1988).
Such a showing requires the BPT to make a reasonable determination that the parole was "improvidently granted" in light of the facts.
Factual circumstances may include a prisoner's history of escape attempts, physical or mental deterioration, or any new evidence indicating that parole should not be granted. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
15, § 2451 (1988). In reaching its decision, the BPT must balance the
interests and rights of the individual prisoner with society's interest
in safety and the administration of justice. See In re Fain, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 376, 389, 135 Cal. Rptr. 543, 550 (1976).
The court then considered which of three review standards were
applicable in determining whether the BPT abused its discretion in
rescinding Powell's parole. Powell contended that the court should
apply its "independent judgment" to the facts, as did the trial court.
Under this test, a court may find an abuse of discretion when it exercises its own judgment and determines that the weight of the evidence does not support the administrative finding. See Campbell v.
Southern Pac. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 51, 60, 583 P.2d 121, 126-27, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 596, 601-02 (1978). Powell attempted to analogize his habeas
corpus proceeding to an administrative proceeding which, under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, permits the application of
either the "independent judgment" or "substantial evidence" standards of review. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1989). Although the court noted that habeas corpus was permissible in Powell's case, it concluded that Powell's analogy was
flawed. The court found that the "independent judgment" standard
does not apply to parole rescissions since a prisoner has no vested
right to parole. See, e.g., Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144-46, 481
P.2d 242, 252-54, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 244-46 (1971) (discussing the distinction between vested and nonvested rights). Here, Powell has no
vested right to parole. See In re Fain, 65 Cal. App. 3d at 390, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 551; see also In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 87, 357 P.2d 1080,
1086, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824, 830 (1960).
The court also declined to adopt the "substantial evidence" standard of review. This test requires the court to accept as true all evi-
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dence favoring the party and to disregard any damaging evidence. If
such favorable evidence supports the decision as a matter of law, the
decision must be affirmed. See generally 8 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs § 265 (3d ed. 1985).
Instead, the court adopted the "some evidence" standard, which requires a court to affirm a prior administrative decision if there is supporting evidence in the record. The court relied on a prior case
which held that an abuse of discretion occurs only when an authority
acts "without information, fraudulently, or on mere personal caprice." In re Spence, 36 Cal. App. 3d 636, 639-40, 111 Cal. Rptr. 782,
784 (1974). The United States Supreme Court has upheld the "some
evidence" standard of review in an analogous case. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). Thus, the court held that while the
BPT may not act "arbitrarily or capriciously," it need only find some
evidence to support a rescission of parole. The court added, however,
that the "some evidence" standard of review does not necessarily pertain to parole revocations after the prisoner has been released.
In applying the "some evidence" standard of review to Powell's
case, the court focused on the Sutton Report which was the basis for
the BPT's decision. The court noted that although the opinion testimony contained within the report relied in part on hearsay, such
opinion testimony is admissible if the opposing party fails to object.
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 803 (West 1966); see also People v. Coleman, 38

Cal. 3d 69, 90, 695 P.2d 189, 202, 211 Cal. Rptr. 102, 115 (1985).
In addition to the Sutton Report, the court determined that Powell's medical and disciplinary history, symptoms of brain atrophy, and
reports by other examining physicians conceding the difficulty associated with predicting a parolee's potential for violence, were sufficient
to satisfy the "some evidence" standard of review. Even though some
of these medical reports conflicted, the court held that it was within
the BPT's discretion to determine the admissibility and weight to be
afforded such evidence. See In re Carroll, 80 Cal. App. 3d 22, 31, 145
Cal. Rptr. 34, 339 (1978).
The court's decision to adopt a lower standard of review in parole
rescission cases gives the BPT greater discretion and weight in its decisions. A finding of merely "some evidence" in support of the BPT's
parole rescission is now sufficient to affirm that decision. In the end,
more parole decisions will likely be determined at the administrative
level, with far less chance for reversal on judicial appeal.
BRYAN HANCE

Ix. TORTS
Suspicions of wrongdoing are enough to commence the
statute of limitations; the denial of a class action
certificate will not toll the statute, nor will new case law
revive a stale claim: Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.
In Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 751 P.2d 923, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 658 (1988), the supreme court unanimously held that in a suit
against manufacturers of the drug estrogen diethylstilbestrol (DES),
the statute of limitations commences once the plaintiff is aware of an
injury and its negligent cause. Id. at 1109, 751 P.2d at 926-27, 245 Cal.
Rptr. at 661 (citing Sanchez v. South Hoover Hosp., 18 Cal. 3d 93, 99,
553 P.2d 1129, 1133, 132 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661-63 (1976)). Although the
plaintiff was unaware of which particular manufacturer was responsible for her injuries, the one-year statute commenced once she knew
of the injury and suspected the cause to be DES-related.
In 1972, the plaintiff (whose mother had consumed DES in 1951)
was diagnosed as having adenosis, a pre-cancerous condition, which
ultimately resulted in major surgery. Suspecting DES as the cause,
plaintiff's efforts to locate the manufacturer were nonetheless
unsuccessful.
The plaintiff brought suit in 1981, nearly one year after the court's
decision in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-12, 607
P.2d 924, 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-45 (1980) (holding that when
the identity of the particular DES manufacturer is unobtainable, all
DES manufacturers may be joined and damages will be apportioned
by "market share," unless liability is disproved). See generally 6 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1275 (9th ed. 1988);
63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 167 (1984 & Supp. 1988); 50 CAL.
JUR. 3D Products Liability §§ 4, 26 (1979 & Supp. 1988); Note, DES
and a Proposed Theory of EnterpriseLiability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
963 (1978); Annotation, "Concert of Activity," "AlternativeLiability,"
"EnterpriseLiability," or Similar Theory as Basis for Imposing Liability Upon One or More ManuKfacturers of Defective Uniform Product in Absence of Identification of Manufacturerof Precise Unit or
Batch Causing Injury, 22 A.L.R. 4TH 183 (1983); Annotation, Products
Liability: Diethylstilbestrol (DES), 2 A.L.R. 4TH 1091 (1980).
The plaintiff delayed suit, believing she would be unsuccessful
under McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 84, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 730, 735 (1978) (no cause of action is stated unless the particular
manufacturer is identified). The plaintiff contended that her suit
should not be time-barred since essential facts, such as the meaning
of "causation" and "wrongdoing" as redefined under Sindell, were
not available to her until 1980. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3)
(West 1982) (one year statute of limitations for injury from wrongful
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act or neglect). However, the court confirmed its continued adherence to the "discovery rule." See generally 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Actions § 413 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1988); 51 AM. JUR. 2D
Limitation of Actions §§ 102-06 (1970 & Supp. 1988); 43 CAL. JUR. 3D
Limitation of Actions § 72 (1978 & Supp. 1988); 10A CALIFORNIA
FORMS OF PLEADING & PRACTICE ANNOTATED, Limitation of Actions
8 (Supp. 1988).
The court stated that the receipt of essential facts does not commence the statute; rather, the controlling element is plaintiff's suspicion that she was wronged. The court determined that neither the
plaintiff's ignorance of a tortfeasor's identity nor the existence of unknown "critical facts" will delay the statute from running. The court
rationalized this harsh result by noting that "Doe parties" could have
been named in a timely action, thus giving the plaintiff three years to
discover the defendant's identity. See generally L. MASON, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK § 8.382(7) (1987) [hereinafter MASON]; 1 CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 7.19 (1977).
The plaintiff's most significant argument was that Sindell itself
was a "critical fact" tolling the statute until 1980. Before Sindell,
only one manufacturer could be a wrongdoer and no causal link
could be established to any one manufacturer. However, after
Sindell, all manufacturers of DES, unless otherwise proved, had committed a tort on the plaintiff; thus, only after Sindell could the plaintiff be reasonably expected to have brought a successful action.
The court clarified its "market share" theory by explaining that
Sindell created neither a "new tort" nor a "new product" of "generic
DES." The "mere existence of a contrary precedent ... [is not] sufficient to toll the statute .... " Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1116, 751 P.2d at 931,
245 Cal. Rptr. at 666 (quoting Monroe v. Trustees of the California
State College, 6 Cal. 3d 399, 408 n.5, 491 P.2d 1105, 1110-11 n.5, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 134-35 n.5 (1971). The court put forth three supporting reasons for this rule: (1) potential plaintiffs will be motivated to challenge unpopular rulings and will force judges to remain progressive;
(2) the rule will protect defendants from having to defend their actions long after evidence and witnesses have vanished; and (3) to hold
otherwise would release the floodgates of litigation.
The plaintiff's final argument, that the filing of the class action in
Sindell tolled the statute for individual plaintiffs from the time of application to denial of certification, likewise was rejected by the court.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (Once a class action is filed, the action is commenced for all class members.); MASON, supra § 6.641. The United

States Supreme Court has held that where certification is denied because of "subtle factors," the statute is tolled until denial of the class
certificate. American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552-53
(1974) (class too numerous to make joinder practicable); see generally
51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 268 (1970 & Supp. 1987). The
plaintiff asserted that American Pipe should be extended to the present case. See, e.g., Bangert v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 163 Cal. App.
3d 207, 212, 209 Cal. Rptr. 438, 441 (1984) (statute tolled when certification denied for lack of insufficient community of interest).
However, the Sindell class did not seek damages on behalf of the
entire class. Because Sindell's class action did not notify the defendants of all potential plaintiffs, the court believed an extension of
American Pipe would be unfair. The court explained that American
Pipe was predicated on an economical litigation policy favoring the
tolling of the statute when only "subtle factors" cause certificate denial. The court noted that such a policy is more efficient than the filing of protective motions to intervene or to join should the class be
denied. Accordingly, the court rejected plaintiff's argument under
American Pipe because the denial of the certificate in Sindell was
not a "subtle factor," as denial was due to the very nature of the action-"mass-tort actions" are rarely granted class action certification.
The impact of this decision could affect approximately one-third of
the seventy-five DES cases pending in California. See Justices Again
Brought in Legal Protectionsfor Drug Makers, L.A. Times, Apr. 8,
1988, at 3, col. 4. Additionally, it may affect many more as the drug
was given to three million women from the 1940's to 1971. See DES,
UPI, Apr. 7, 1988 (NEXUS library, Omnifile) (estimating that 200 to
300 DES cases are currently pending in California). Jolly places women in a "catch twenty-two": to file their claim before Sindell when
recovery chances were nominal, or to file after Sindell when the suit
is likely to be time-barred. Nevertheless, the decision allows drug
manufacturers to allocate more time and resources to research and
less to defense of stale actions.
MICHELLE
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